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Summary
Until the establishment of the colonial administration, Somali society had no central state 
structures with wide ranges of functions. However, this did not imply absence of political 
authority or legitimate institutions. Through a range of kinship associations, Somali society 
has managed its political affairs without resorting to hierarchical or elitist political 
arrangements. This is attributed to the pastoral mode of production that neither required nor 
afforded scope for centralised state institutions, the clan lineage structure and major divisions 
within the Somali society. The coastal towns at times formed the basis for small sultanates 
linked to the trade based empires which were often small and outside the main pastoral 
system. The classical argument that describes the Somali society as homogenous people that 
belong to one ethnic group, speak the same language, follow the same religion and share the 
same culture and tradition is based on fallacies and simplistic generalisations. Somali society 
has always been divided into nomadic pastoralists in the north and southern agro-pastoralists 
with clear cultural, linguistic, and social differences. Before the two colonially defined 
Somali states merged in 1960, Somali people had lived in five separate territories - Djibouti, 
Ogaden and Haud in Ethiopia, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the Northern 
Frontier District in Kenya with different official language and system of administration. Most 
territorial boundaries also roughly corresponded to clan boundaries. Ignoring these 
differences and other important factors, most observers have concentrated almost exclusively 
on clans and lineage structures and have reduced the complex problems of Somali politics 
and state collapse to a single cause.
Under the colonial rule institutional structures, which incorporated concepts that were entirely 
alien and incompatible to the existing Somali political structures, were imposed. This created 
a discrepancy between the highly decentralized pastoral structures and the highly central 
nature of the colonial and post-colonial state. The incompatibility was intensified by the 
transfer of power and authority of the traditional structures from pastoral groups to 
centralized urban-based political structures, which remained irrelevant to the needs of the 
majority of the nomadic population, and treated pastoralism only as a source of revenue. The 
exploitation of the pastoral and agro-pastoral majority by the urban minority became more 
intense with a total monopoly of power by the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre. The country’s 
economy in general and the rural sector in particular suffered during the decade and a half 
experiment of Scientific Socialism and the especially subsequent half decade of structural 
decay mistitled adjustment, in which most sectors of the economy were brought under 
government control and/orownership and many new state-owned agencies with absolute 
monopolies were created. It was during this period that increased poverty and livelihood 
insecurity intensified the conflict over resources and subsequently the conflict over state
power. The substantial development-aid that the regime received also became a source of 
fierce competition between groups. The household economy impact was mitigated by a huge 
rise and diversification of the long standing contribution of remittance flows but this did little 
for the domestic economy and still less for state capacity or legitimacy.
While these were some of the root causes of the conflict, the more immediate antecedents of 
the current complex political emergency had been the Ogaden war in 1977-78, the influx of
1.3 million of Somali refugees from Ethiopia, the attempted coup following the Ogaden war 
and the formation of opposition movements based in Ethiopia. A major consequence of the 
Ogaden war has been the proliferation of weapons, which became widely available in most 
parts of the country as both the government and opposition movements armed large sections 
of the civilian population. Somalia was one of the most heavily militarized states in Africa 
and one of the top recipients of both US and USSR military aid during the Cold War. Even 
before the collapse of the state there had already been substantial weapons in the hands of 
rebel groups and civilians throughout the country, a tradition which is deeply embedded in 
Horn cultures and has been for decades partly because states have been widely perceived as 
inadequate protectors and dangerous marauders.
The current CPE started in 1988 when a major war broke out between the government forces 
and the Somali National M ovement in northern cities of Burao and Hargeisa. More than
100,000 people lost their lives in this war and the government forces destroyed most towns in 
the area forcing almost the entire Isaaq population to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti. The civil 
war in the south that started after Siad Barre’s forces were defeated in January 1991 also 
displaced an estimated 1.7 million, while up to half a million people were either killed in the 
war or died as a result of the devastating famine in 1991-92. The UN multi-mandate 
intervention had only a marginal impact on containing the famine, but its attempt to 
reconstitute a central state only strengthened the role of warlords, who have played a central 
role in all its reconciliation efforts, and created further divisions. The UN failed to understand 
and appreciate the root causes and dynamics of the complex emergency and its intervention 
sustained the war econom y by giving contracts worth millions of dollars to the factions 
associated with the warlords by creating a series of unreal decentralised nominal political 
entities with slim on non existent constituencies and systematically focusing on warlords 
(military leaders) and virtually excluding peacelords (elders and merchants who would regain 
dominance were the wars to end). This approach to reconciliation contrasted sharply with the 
successful peace-making and reconciliation efforts in Somaliland where traditional methods 
of mediation and reconciliation were used to end conflict, establish a framework for resolving 
future disputes, and rebuild a foundation for a new system of governance.
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With the exception of Somaliland and the northeast region there has been very little 
rehabilitation work and most of the international aid is still largely confined to emergency 
assistance. Despite the existence of stability and relative peace since 1992, Somaliland has 
also particularly received relatively little rehabilitation aid because of questions over the 
international legitimacy of the government. In areas where some rehabilitation programmes 
have started, there is no coherent, integrated strategic framework for post-conflict 
rehabilitation. Most aid programmes have been delivered through NGOs that implement 
small-scale, fragmented and unintegrated projects with the aim to scale up these activities 
once a central government is formed. The European C om m ission’s aid programme is 
probably an exception to this framework employed by the UN - with the exception of 
UNICEF which has systematically sought to operate via, or in support of, government or 
quasi government basic service delivery committees/ministries - and most NGOs. The 
alternative criteria for rehabilitation and reconstruction programm es specify the existence of 
peace and security and responsible authorities on the regional and local level and not the 
existence or expectation of a common central state.
Despite the collapse of state institutions and breakdown of physical infrastructure, the 
informal sector in Somaliland and the northeast region has proved resilient. Economy is 
booming, businesses are thriving, and informal markets are functioning remarkably well. The 
existence of a free-market environment has facilitated the re-establishment of remittance 
flows from Somali expatriates living abroad and the repatriation of capital and people who 
brought new skills and ideas. In both of these regions where law and order has been restored, 
there has been a shift from war and survival-oriented econom y to a functioning market 
economy. Encouraged by the absence of excessive regulations, corruption, and market 
intervention, the private sector has started providing a whole range of new services some of 
which the country had never seen before and many of which had been unavailable during the 
previous regime.
If you want to dismantle a hedge,
Remove one thombush at a time.
Somali Proverb
Development is about human beings. They need 
four things. First is water. It is the first thing 
needed to live. W ithout it a plant, an animal or a 
baby dies. Second is food. W ithout enough of it, 
life is miserable and short. Third, once water and 
food are won, is health - otherwise the human being 
becomes sick. Fourth is education, once a human 
being has water, food and health he needs to learn to 
open new horizons and unlock new possibilities.
And there is a fifth - peace and order. Without those 
none of the four basic needs can be sustained.
Somali Elder,
Baidoa, 1995
1. Background
1.1 Early Political History
For centuries nomadic pastoralism provided a livelihood to the Somali people in the Horn of 
Africa. The earliest European travelers described Somalis as “proud nomads” with a unique 
way of life and social structures (Burton 1966). Before the colonial partition of the Somali 
“territories” in the middle of the nineteenth century, the history of the region had been 
dominated by massive expansion of Somalis into areas originally inhabited by other 
populations. The first documented wars took place during this period as indigenous peoples, 
displaced by the Somali expansion, fought back and resisted Somali territorialism. It was 
during this period that the first holy wars against Abyssinia took place, including the most 
important war fought by the famous religious leader known as Ahmed Gran (1506-43). By 
successfully capturing large parts of Abyssinia, it marked the first time that Somali clans 
joined to realize a common cause. The rapid evaporation of that state and of its highland 
conquests - which reached fifty miles of present Addis Ababa - was equally early evidence of 
the non fit of strung, durable states and Somali national culture.
There is evidence that the earliest city-states scattered along the Eastern Somali shores 
emerged with a distinctly Swahili and Arab influence. Early urban settlements from the 
Swahili city state period were superimposed upon and administered by Arab merchants; 
included among them are coastal towns such as Zeila on the Red Sea, M ogadishu Benadir, 
Brava, M erca and Kismayu in the south. The bustling commercial trade in these urban centers 
subsequently attracted Somali settlements. The populations on the Red Sea coast are
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considered to have been particularly important, drawing what many consider to be the first 
sophisticated trade networks to Africa. Thus, since early periods, trade has played a crucial 
role in the livelihoods of Somali nomads, helping them to diversify their incomes and cope 
with frequent droughts. The most severe famines took place in those years when civil wars 
disrupted trade and nomads were unable to exchange their animals to buy food grains.
The Somali people had a series of limited function and duration “nation states” until the 
partition of their territories and the introduction of the colonial administration, which took 
place between 1860 and 1897. The largest Somali “state” before independence was arguably 
that of Ahmed Gran, which stretched its frontiers into parts of the Ogaden and Ethiopia. 
Between the early 1900s and 1920, Sayid Muhamed Abdille Hassan (“Mad M ullah”) fought 
the British administration in Somaliland. He also fought Somali clans in an attempt to force 
them to join him in his “holy” war (jihad) with the British colony. He appears to have drawn 
on the heritage of Northwest Highland/Haud proto states and also the Mahdist anti colonial 
and Islamic nationalist dynamic more dramatically and on a larger scale exemplified in late 
19th century Sudan.
1.2 Social Structure
Until the establishment of the colonial administration, Somali society had no stable, 
territorially extensive central states with wide ranges of functions. But this did not imply the 
absence of political authority or legitimate institutions. Through a range of kinship 
associations, Somali society has managed its political affairs without resorting to hierarchical 
or elitist political arrangements. This is attributed to the pastoral mode of production that 
neither required nor could afford centralised state institutions. While such comparisons 
cannot be pushed too far, it also resembles early mediaeval European state modes with strong 
local lords, weak kings, peripatetic courts and rapid shifts in territorial extent of the super- 
structural kingdoms and empires. The Somali social and political structure consists, loosely, of 
clan families and clans which sub-divide into sub-clans, primary lineage, and “dia-paying” 
groups. The dia-paying group (Jilib /  Bah) is the most stable unit with a membership of groups 
of families ranging from a few hundred to more than a thousand. The members of each dia- 
paying group have an informal contractual agreement to support one another and to share 
payments and receipt of compensations. The term “dia paying”, wherein dia means “blood 
money”, implies that families within the group have a collective responsibility for settling acts 
committed by, or against, their members. The compensation paid for homicide is one hundred 
camels1 per man, or half of that should a woman be killed, irrespective of whether the death is
1 This can also be paid out in their equivalent in other animals or cash.
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accidental or not. However, membership in a clan does not automatically give one certain rights 
and obligations. Those are negotiated and agreed in unwritten contracts. Indeed, kinship ties in 
urban towns are not as strong as in rural areas and many urban folk do not contribute to this 
system of insurance despite maintaining links with their lineage groups. The groups rarely have 
single “traditional leaders” opting instead for a council of elders who have joint responsibilities. 
Throughout the duration of the colonial administration, elders were recognised and paid to act 
as the legitimate representatives of their groups.
The dia-paying groups also function as mutual aid groups during periods of emergency and have 
a common agreement to help each other during crises. Although this is less formal than official 
compensation, a very strong sense of solidarity and a high degree of co-operation closely link 
the members of the group. Members have an obligation to both help those who are undergoing 
severe hardship during crises and to observe traditional wealth-sharing mechanisms. This close 
association is indicated by the fact that camels, historically their most important asset, are 
embodied in the group’s symbol rather than that of the individual family. In times of crisis, each 
clan member is expected to observe the moral system or code of conduct. This manifests itself 
in activities such as mixed herding, loan sharing, Xoola Goyn (giving animals), Zakaat and alms 
giving. These collective coping strategies effectively limit individual risks and facilitate 
rehabilitation after periods of crises, at least up to the point at which too large a proportion of 
group members have been pauperised by drought, animal disease or war. Breaking community 
norms can have serious consequences for the individual or groups concerned. The importance of 
this social mortar is indicated in many poems and stories emanating from the Somali oral 
tradition. Such narratives warn people against opportunistic actions that may damage the social 
reputation of their group or clan.
The political and social affairs of traditional Somali society, from dia-paying groups to clans, 
are managed largely by ad hoc councils called shir. Their legal foundations are founded on an 
informal contract (heer) used to settle disputes and guided by Islamic Law (qaanuun). 
Lineage groups determine the questions of how to settle legal and political disputes. An 
assembly (shir) interprets heer and deliberates on the best way to address or resolve conflicts. 
It also has the authority to declare or to make peace. A ssem blies promote democratic 
participation as all men are allowed to participate in consultative deliberations that are held in 
public venues. Although women do not participate directly, they still exert a strong indirect 
influence on the various assemblies through the household. In essence, through these 
elements of participatory democracy, the shirs embody an egalitarian system in which all 
men, regardless of socio-economic rank, have an equal right to participate in these councils. 
Often elders (odayaal) with more prestige and experience are asked to mediate disputes and 
act as leaders and chairpersons.
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2. CPE and State Collapse
2.1 Understanding Social Divisions and State Collapse
A majority of the more recent examinations of the Somali political crisis are based on 
fallacies and simplistic generalizations of the supposed uniqueness of the Somali people as a 
culturally homogenous entity (M ukhtar 1996). They tend to fall into a reductionist trap, 
ignoring the intricacies of Somali politics, while resorting to a one-dimensional vision of 
“conflict based on clanship” (Muggah, 1997). The classical argument claims that all Somali 
people belong to one ethnic group, speak the same language, follow the same region and 
share the same culture and tradition. However, a closer examination of this assertion shows 
that it is inaccurate and misleading. According to Mukhtar (1996), it is a myth invented by 
outsiders. Somali society has always been divided into nomadic pastoralists in the north and 
southern agro-pastoralists “which have distinctively different cultural, linguistic, and social 
structures” (M ukhtar 1996: 543). The importance of livestock in relation to subsistence 
agriculture varies tremendously across various regions; with rural households in the South 
depending more on agriculture while Northerners rely more heavily on livestock and 
remittances. Indeed, people inhabiting the inter-riverine regions speak a different language 
known as M ai M ai, a combination of colloquial local dialects, Swahili and Somali. Before 
independence in 1960, Mai Mai was the second language in the south and both languages 
were broadcast on the radio. The first post-colonial government eventually abandoned 
bilingual media, in its effort to achieve language conformity.
There are other crucial differences that divide the Somali people, shedding additional light on 
earlier misperceptions of a “traditional pastoral” Somalia. These include both differing 
histories and territories. Before the two Somali territories merged in 1960, Somali people 
lived in five separate regions - Djibouti, Ogaden and Haud in Ethiopia, British Somaliland, 
Italian Somaliland, and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. Each territory had a different 
language and system of administration. The official languages in these territories were French 
in D jibouti, Amharic in Ethiopia, English in Somaliland, Italian in Somalia, and Swahili and 
English in the NFD. Moreover, some territorial boundaries also roughly corresponded to clan 
boundaries.
These differences partly explain the rationale behind D jibouti’s refusal to join the other two 
territories when it achieved its independence in 1977. Other elements include the history of 
rivalry and conflict between a Djibouti based trading state and that based on Benadir and of 
both with the highland (Burrao-Hargeisa-Burao-Haud based pastoralist Isaaq led proto states
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and the reality that Northern Djibouti (former Obock) is Danakil (Afar) not Somali (Isa) 
populated with a long (and continuing) history of tension often erupting into war with 
Djibouti proper.
The highland (Isaaq) based nomadic proto states seem to have been more stable and less 
conflict ridden than those in the South from whom they were geographically divided by near 
uninhabitable desert swathes. In addition because access to Gulf trade was crucial to their 
economies they regularly achieved accommodation (include cross clan quasi confederacies) 
with the elders of the Berbera region. This somewhat different political history was 
facilitated by the fact that the Isaaq (unlike other Somali clan/sub clan families) live in 
contiguous areas not in scattered pockets and was later reinforced, quite unintentionally, by 
the British colonial era because British administrations (as indeed French) have been 
surprisingly successfully in creating cross ethnic group territorial loyalties which have 
survived and even grown deeper after independence.
In addition riverain and coastal Somalia has substantial (at least 10%) national minority group 
component-primarily from Swahili and secondarily Oromo origins. Their presence is the 
heritage of the early Swahili coastal sultanates, of the Omanli slave trade and of war. 
Politically powerless (with no sub clan base), culturally downgraded (frequently - as in the 
’old South A frica’ - termed "Bantu") and economically vulnerable (unskilled workers and 
tenants) they have been among the most hard hit by post 1990 events as well as among the 
least visible and least able to cope.
Another misunderstanding of Somali politics has been the elevation of clanship to the most 
dominant variable in the analysis of the current crisis. By almost exclusively concentrating on 
clans and lineage structures, many observers have reduced the complex problems of the 
Somali politics to a single cause (Waldron and Hasci 1994). Understanding clan and lineage 
in the contemporary Somali politics, while necessary, is not sufficient to unlocking the social 
and political organization of the society. For many it has become the definitive guide to 
understanding anything and everything about Somali politics. Extensively detailed charts 
illustrating elaborate clan genealogy, superimposed on the acronyms of the many factions 
litter the literature on Somali society. These charts, which have become both fashionable and 
more worryingly, almost indispensable to many agencies4, are displayed in virtually every 
regional NGO or UN office. Indeed, visitors often use them as “road maps”. Samatar (992: 
639] argues:
Those who wish to demonstrate that Somali tradition is the main source of the
present calamity must unearth the complexity and causal relationships within the
4 1
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traditional ensemble, in order to establish the logic and tendency of that process.
Citing lineage structure and its politicised contemporary form, clanism, as the 
cause of the prevailing havoc and then repeating these claims many times, does 
not provide an adequate explanation of the Somali catastrophe.
The simplistic approach can - for example - hardly be said to be very analytically revealing in 
respect to Mogadishu. General Aideed and Mahdi M ohammed - the South and North 
Mogadishu leaders - were from historically allied sub clans. Within his own sub-can General 
Aideed (and even more his son and heir US M arine Corps Sergeant Aideed) have always 
faced dissenting fractions of elders and sought to keep them in check by calls to blood loyalty 
and by provoking conflicts to make those calls convincing. The third major actor Ali Osman 
Ato is a millionaire merchants who is from the same sub-clan as the Aideeds and was once 
the General’s main financial mobiliser, but now clearly seeks both peace and an alliance with 
Mahdi M ohammed (a fellow merchant but also an elder and thus in Somali terms basically a 
peacelord rather than a military warlord).
How then, did the Somali state collapse? The defeat of Siad Barre marked the final collapse 
of the Somali State but the seeds of disintegration had actually been sown many years earlier. 
Understanding state collapse in Somalia therefore requires looking beyond clanism and on­
going factional intrigue, which is a symptom of state collapse rather than its cause.
The question of the com patibility of the Somali civil society structure with the post-colonial 
(read modem or centralized) state has recently featured some illuminating analysis of the 
Somali state collapse (Doombos and Markakis 1994; Lewis 1994; Simon 1998). It is argued 
that institutional structures which incorporated concepts that were entirely alien to the 
existing Somali political structures, were imposed under the colonial rule. This created a 
discrepancy between the highly decentralized pastoral structures and the highly central nature 
of the post-colonial state. According to Doombos and M arkakis (1994) it is not simply a 
coincidence that the strongest opposition to the centralized state has come from the north 
where a pastoral mode of production is still predominant. (A problem with this contention is 
that the Northwest has also been the only zone to recreate civil governance with a focus on 
basic service rehabilitation, albeit one closely linked to the historic pastoralist territorial 
elders council.) The incompatibility of the two systems was intensified by the transfer of 
power and authority of the traditional structures from pastoral groups to centralized urban- 
based political structures that remained irrelevant to the needs of the majority of the nomadic 
population. This caused pastoralism “to be treated less as a distinct way of life and more as an 
economic resource to be tapped” (Doombos and Markakis 1994: 84). During Siad Barre’s 
regime the exploitation of the pastoral and agro-pastoral majority by the urban minority
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became more intense with a total monopoly of power by the MOD (Marehan - his clan, 
Ogaden - his mother’s clan and Dulbahante - his son-in-law’s clan) coalition. For example, 
while the pastoral economy had provided up to 80 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange, 
only 6 per cent of public expenditure was allocated to this sector in 1974-88 (World Bank 
1991). According to (Simon 1998: 57), since Somalis retained a “social structure” after the 
disintegration of the state,
perhaps there is structure to dissolution; this is significant because, despite the
extent to which Somalia exemplifies anarchy in the minds of many, it suggests that
Somalis do have a future, even if Somalia does not.
Others (Samatar 1988; Samatar 1989), however, disagree with this approach of analysis, 
describing it as “historical” and not particularly relevant to current problems as it assumes 
that the social structure of the Somali society remained intact following its integration into the 
world economy and the centralized state model. They argue that “contemporary” 
commercialization of pastoralism transformed the society as early as the 1920s, and that 
traditional structures have changed even more dramatically since independence.
Serious economic mismanagement has also played a key role and has been one of the 
instrumental causes of state collapse (Mubarak 1997; W orld Bank 1997). Since abandoning 
the experiment of Scientific Socialism in 1980, the government lacked a coherent 
development strategy, its macroeconomic policy was described as “erratic, inconsistent, and 
often moved from one set of objectives to another, thereby confusing the domestic market 
(Mubarak 1997: 2028)” . Though the government had been particularly successful in obtaining 
substantial aid, it had not helped the official economy that was nearing total collapse long 
before the disintegration of the state. It had an extraordinary debt to exports ratio in 1988, 
standing at 240 per cent. In 1990 the external debt was $US 1.9 billion which was equivalent 
to 360 per cent of GDP excluding “frozen debt” to some eastern Europe countries (World 
Bank 1990; IMF 1993). The public sector crisis originated from massive expenditure on 
defense and security services. Recurrent expenditure on the economic and social services 
sector was less 1 per cent during 1988-89 when defense and public administration 
expenditures accounted for 90 per cent of total recurrent expenditures (Mubarak 1997). 
According to the W orld Bank [1997 #382: 159], clan fighting “played no part in its 
collapse...rather, the dynamic of Som alia’s collapse was set in motion during a long period 
(1969-91) of dictatorial rule and egregious economic mism anagem ent by Mohamed Siad 
Barre”. Ironically, between 1982 and 1989, the economy operated very much under the 
structural adjustment and stabilisation programme of the IM F and the World Bank. Indeed, a
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glaring contradiction exists in the W orld Bank’s pronouncements long after events now and 
at the time."
Under Barre, in the early years of his regime, there were significant public expenditures on 
education, infrastructure, veterinary care, and health at least in the southern regions. There 
was also a substantial build-up in state revenue largely from the franco valuta import tax 
system which de facto  bypassed import and exchange control rules. Until the mid 1970’s it 
could therefore be argued that Barre had created the first modem Somali territorial state.
The substantial development aid that the regime received became a source of fierce 
competition between groups. (Doombos and Markakis 1994: 86) point out that:
Because competition took place at the level of the state, a measure of aggregation was 
necessary so that clans could compete effectively at this level. Therefore, the scope of 
clannishness expanded from the lower levels of agnatic kinship to the full clan and 
even the clan family. In this extended form, the clan came to rival the nation.
The regime was also highly successful in obtaining military aid. Som alia was one of the most 
heavily m ilitarized states in Africa and one of the top recipients of both US and USSR 
military aid during the Cold W ar (Gross 1996). The US, for instance, provided approximately 
$US 550 million worth of weapons and military assistance to the regime between 1982 and 
1989 (Lefebvre 1991). Moreover, more than 80 per cent of the large refugee aid, which in 
1986 together with other non-military aid was 25 per cent of GNP (M axted and Zegeye 
1997), was diverted mainly to the army (African Rights and M ines Advisory Group 
D ecem ber 1993). These arms and funds were used by the regim e to bolster an army of
100.000 men and to give military training to the entire civil service.
2.2 Origins of the Conflict
2.2.1 A Hasty Union
A root cause of certain current dilemmas can be retraced to the rapid union of the two Somali 
territories and the formation the first 'United' Somali state in 1960. British Somaliland 
became independent on 26 June 1960 and united five days later with the Italian protectorate
2 T he B ank’s assessm ent is right but it is also worth adding that it supported and generously funded this 
“egregious econom ic mismanagement” for more than two decades and that its early to mid 1980's reports were 
much m ore positive while in 1987 it still seemed largely unaware that civil governance and basic services had 
already atrophied to the verge of non-existence
in the south which became independent on July 1 1960. Despite formidable problems insofar 
as achieving integration with very limited preparation, the union went ahead as planned. This 
was due, in part, to “independence euphoria” and Somali nationalistic fervor, emerging from 
the colonial partition of the Somali territories and the recent transfer of Haud and Reserve 
Area to Ethiopia. The differing colonial and pre colonial heritage of the two states meant that 
there were major differences which proved extremely difficult to reconcile. These included 
different legal, administrative, economic and political systems. Language barriers further 
complicated these historical contradictions; English and Italian had been the official 
languages of the two states prior to their union. While many southern politicians learned 
English during the British military occupation, few people from the north were particularly 
well versed in Italian. But each language continued to be used in both public as well as 
private business. The presence of a large Italian expatriate community in the south also 
hindered national integration as they ferociously supported the continuation of their language 
and system of administration.
Soon after the independence, the northerners became disillusioned with the way the union 
was proceeding. In the interest of the “union” , the north initially accepted the conditions 
demanded by southern leaders. Mogadishu became the capital and the base of the newly 
created Somali parliament. Southern Somalis also held all major posts in the new 
government, and a majority of seats in the parliament. At the same time the position of 
Hargeisa changed from its previous role as capital of a state to a remote and unimportant 
provincial town with very poor links and communication to the capital. As the only means of 
communication between the two cities was a journey by road that took an average of three 
days, Hargeisa became both politically and geographically isolated. Adam (1994: 24) explains 
why the northerners felt neglected:
The south provided the capital city, the anthem, the flag and the constitution. The 
parliament elected a southern president who nominated a southern prime minister 
.... The north gave up the possibility of joining the British Commonwealth while 
the south openly flaunted its links with Italy. Italian legal experts drafted the 
Constitution in an undisguised attempt to graft the Italian multi-party democracy 
on to independent Somalia. Before the British had agreed to grant independence 
to Somaliland, Italian officials had finalised the Constitution. Northern politicians 
and lawyers had virtually no chance to make even marginal changes in the draft.
As early as June 1961 there was widespread discontent with the union as expressed in a 
national referendum for the provisional constitution under which the two states merged. At 
least half of the electorate boycotted the referendum and more than half - on some reports up
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to three quarters - of those who took part voted against it in the former British Somaliland. 
The intensity of the northerners discontent was further underlined by a short-lived coup (the 
first in sub-Saharan Africa) staged by a contingent of military officers in December of the 
same year to restore the independence of Somaliland (Adam 1994). The High Court 
ultimately threw out treason charges against N orthern/Protectorate’ officers holding that the 
Union was void, because it contradicted the underlying Somaliland Parliament Act which 
required separate majorities in both North and South to validate the Union. Although these 
events clearly showed that the northerners were dissatisfied with the union, southern leaders, 
who had the majority of the seats in both the government and the parliament and - perhaps more 
relevant - dominated the armed forces, did relatively little to address these grievances. Instead 
they adopted measures aimed at enforcing speedy and full integration which only aggravated 
existing tensions and further alienated the northerners.
The government’s development programmes also failed to tackle the serious problems of 
underdevelopment in the north, problems inherited from the colonial administration. 
Compared to the south, the British colonial administration had done relatively little economic 
development in the north before the Second W orld W ar as it concentrated on defeating the 
two-decade long Dervish movement of Sayid M ohamed Abdulle Hassan. The British 
government found this war, which at some points involved air raids, extremely costly and was 
unprepared to provide funds for development (Lewis 1980), especially as the Protectorate had 
been occupied not for its own importance but primarily to counter the French at Djibouti and 
the Italians at Benadir (Mogadishu) and Massawa and secondarily to provide a source of 
livestock for Aden. Post war development - water, health (including a paramedical 
programme reaching pastoralists) and education plus some port, highway and urban 
infrastructure at Hargeisa and Berbera was late, brief and limited even compared to other 
British colonies albeit not necessarily so in comparison with Somalia outside Mogadishu. 
Nevertheless the system of administration inherited from the British was far superior to the 
highly corrupt system of the Italians in the south. Although, in theory, the two systems of 
administration were integrated, an exceptionally strong Italian influence has still remained in 
the public sector core of all Somali governments since independence. This “Italian factor” 
(which courts in Italy found incorporated high level of corruption involving senior Italian 
government officials and ministers, the Mafia and the last Somali regime) has been attributed 
to the widespread corruption and nepotism in public life.
The northerners were not the only group disillusioned with the union. The Rehanwein from 
the inter-riverine region, which had the same number of seats with the two other major clan 
families of Hawiye and Darod in the south before unification, became marginalised relative to 
the two former groups after the union (Mukhtar 1996). Their language which used be
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broadcast on Radio Mogadishu, was terminated and was roundly discouraged in southern 
Somalia. These groups also faced language problems and systemic discrimination in both the 
educational and governmental sectors.
2.2.2 Military Coup in 1969 and Socialist Policies
Consistent with the European tradition of democratic political institutions, the constitution in 
1960 guaranteed not only unity of two Somali territories but also democracy and a forum that 
sanctioned multi-partyism and guarantees to de jure  freedom of expression. Significant 
political differences encouraged a proliferation of parties “to the point where Somalia had 
more parties per capita than any other democratic country except Israel” (Laitin and Samatar 
1987: 69). In the country’s last multi-party elections, held in March 1969, more than 60 
parties contested. In addition to the problems in the north, there had been widespread 
corruption and nepotism at all levels of government. Indeed, very little civil governance or 
service delivery existed. It was against this background that the successful coup, which 
brought Siad Barre to power in 1969, took place.
Given the widespread discontent with the progress for the nine years after independence, 
there was significant public support for the coup and people anticipated a positive alternative 
to the failed political system. Siad Barre immediately suspended the country’s constitution 
and banned all forms of political and professional association. “Promising to cure all of the 
country’s ills” he also decreed in the following year the adoption of Scientific Socialism 
which he claimed was fully compatible with Islam and the reality of the nomadic society 
(Lewis 1994: 150). Under the slogan of “socialism unites, tribalism  divides” , clan and kinship 
ties were officially banned (albeit in fact manipulated in very divisive unaccountable and non 
traditional ways) and the new government promised to root out any reference, verbal or 
written, to clanship. In order to stem and ultimately eliminate the tradition of blood money 
payments between groups, the regime also introduced the death sentence for those convicted 
of homicide.
Sweeping political and legal changes were also introduced in the first few years of the coup. 
These included the establishment of a repressive security apparatus. Among the most 
notorious agencies were the National Security Service (NSS) and Guulxvadayaasha (Victory 
Pioneers). These security agencies were directly controlled by the greatest “Victory Pioneer” 
(■Guulwade) of all, Siad Barre himself. To consolidate pow er he established a formidable 
propaganda machine. “Countless posters, poems, songs of praise, and speeches proclaimed 
his sublime role as the ‘father’ of a nation whose ‘mother’ was the Revolution” (Lewis 1994: 
152). The cult personality of Siad Barre, created by the state propaganda machine,
#
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overshadowed the other twenty-five members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council who 
were all army and police officers (ibid.). He also acquired special powers by surrounding 
him self with a loyal group of supporters, putting them in key posts. While publicly 
renouncing clannism, he in fact created this monopoly of power via the political hegemony of 
the MOD clan coalition. He established these extensive powers, to quash any real or imagined 
threat to his authority. Barre had effectively taken his place among the African B ig M en’.
Siad Barre’s political propaganda machine was particularly effective in misleading the 
outside world. Some observers took his propaganda seriously, confusing rhetoric with reality. 
Accepting, at face value, his propaganda, (Laitin and Samatar 1987) appeared impressed with 
the “success” of the revolution and observed that “Siyaad’s socialism mobilized the Somali 
people, and this helped them overcome colonial-inspired alienation. Through his speeches 
and the orientation courses in military camps, Siyaad began to inculcate values of self-help 
and initiative” .
In the first few years most sectors of the economy were brought under government ownership. 
A wave of nationalization (qarameyn) of all medium size business, including banks, schools, 
insurance firms, imports, and whole sale trade started in the early 1970s. Many new state- 
owned agencies, maintaining absolute monopolies, were created as a foundation for a 
socialist economy. These included the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) and 
Ente Nazionale di Commercio (ENC) which were responsible for the purchase, storage, sale 
and distribution of all food items. Private traders were prohibited, by law, to import, store, 
purchase or distribute food items.
Initially it was not clear how this new system of public ownership of the means of production 
was going to affect nomads and agro-pastoralist, but it soon became clear that wealthy 
nomads and farmers who owned many herds of animals were to be treated as “workers” rather 
than capitalists. The government also created state-owned cooperatives for rural communities. 
Some farming communities were established, but the government found nomads largely 
uncooperative. As a result of these policies, the country apparently experienced a sudden 
econom ic decline. During the drought in 1974-75 output (and capital stock in herds) declined 
dram atically and apparently did not recover fully until the 1980's. It was during this period 
that increased poverty and livelihood insecurity intensified the conflict over resources and 
subsequently the conflict over state power.
However, official pronouncements and statistics on the economy - as on the degree of popular 
‘enthusiasm ’ for the Barre regime - cannot be taken at face value. The non-recorded economy 
- especially in commerce fuelled by unofficial exports and rapidly growing remittances - grew
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rapidly and, by definition, was private sector. Furthermore it was tolerated as a source of state 
revenue (via the Franco valuta tax system), of public service pay (via illicit ‘user’ or ‘blind 
eye’ fees) and of payoffs to the leaderships. To a lesser but significant extent domestic 
livestock and crop trade ‘bypassed’ official entities grossly distorting official figures.
Until the 1974-5 drought and the rapid subsequent rise in ‘security’ spending, most Somalis 
in fact had higher incomes and more access to services. Even in the 1980s Southern Somalis 
with access to remittances and/or producing crops/livestock were not poor nor becoming 
radically poorer by African standards although their access to public services was 
deteriorating rapidly (Green and Jamal, 1987). However, because of the size of the 
unrecorded economy and the shift of some production into the recorded zone after World 
Bank/IMF imposed formal liberalisation the apparent economic speedup of the 1980's is 
largely a statistical illusion (ibid.). Nationalisation was also rather less than it appeared - a 
collection of archaic units initially aimed at the Italian settler community and of later 
production units peripheral to the real economy and inherently non viable. The two main 
exceptions were Somalofruit (some banana plantation and all export commercialisation) and 
the sugar corporations. Both were the practice Italian managed enclaves - the first rather well, 
albeit with M afia overtones and the second quite badly. While wasting resources - except for 
Somalo fruit - the state 'productive' enterprise sector was neither very different from that in 
capitalist African states nor, by itself, large enough to explain either state capacity erosion or 
broader economic problems.
2.2.3 1974-75 “Prolonged” Famine (Abaartii Dabadheer)
The socialist experiment - and perhaps more crucial, the political hostility to an opposition area 
- turned the 1974-75 drought into a major famine in the north resulted in more than 20,000 
deaths (Hitcock and Hussein 1987), forcing 300,000 (10-15 per cent of the entire pastoral 
population) nomads to register in relief camps (Haaland and Keddeman 1984). There was a 
serious shortage of food and sudden collapse of entitlements throughout the northern regions. 
The nationalisation of banking, imports and wholesale trade and the introduction of price 
controls seriously disrupted food markets in the northern regions. Even more damaging was the 
effective shutting down of the major historic Arabian-Somaliland-Ethiopian trade axis with 
closure of the Ethiopian border and tight controls at Berbera. The first response by the private 
traders to the introduction of nationalisation and a centrally controlled system in the early 1970s 
was panic hoarding and speculation. This was further exacerbated by the failure of the food 
rationing system, introduced by the government to replace the free market system. Hundreds of 
government-owned shops selling food items at fixed prices were opened in major towns and 
villages. Residents were issued with identity cards to buy fixed amounts of food every week, but
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because of a shortage of supplies, only a small numbers of people managed to buy sufficient 
food in these shops. In rural areas, unregistered pastoralists relied on food purchased in the 
black market at exorbitant prices.
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Even so, the degree to which the pastoral and trading economic sectors were weakened remains 
unclear as both became adept at concealing transactions. Total exports were sustained because 
of the growing markets in Saudi Arabia and the coastal Arab States replacing those in Ethiopia.
In practice, the currency was moderately stable with little margin between black market and 
official rates. However, ex-British Somaliland was a non-favoured zone under Barre and one 
whose trade links (especially with Ethiopia) were more seriously affected and may (data are 
very fragmentary) have had a lower than average share in the rising remittance earning workers 
"over the water".
The widespread crop failure and the subsequent food shortages in neighbouring Ethiopia also 
contributed to the food crisis in the region. Since the introduction of the food rationing 
system, a majority of the Somali pastoralists in the region depended on cereal grains from the 
Hararghe region in Ethiopia despite serious attempts to close the border which raised costs 
and rendered arrival uncertain. Traumatically, this region was also severely affected by the 
drought in Ethiopia and grain prices were reported to have tripled during the famine.
The toll of the drought was enormous, killing an estimated 5 million animals (Haaland and 
Keddeman 1984) in Somalia/Somaliland and having far-reaching consequences on the rural 
economy. W hile the effects of the drought were received differently throughout Somalia, the 
rural population has never fully recovered from the disaster. The export of animals 
plummeted and rem ained much lower than was forecast prior to the drought. Pursuing its 
objective of settling and converting pastoralists to farmers, the government carried out a 
resettlement experim ent involving the transfer of over 100,000 thousand nomads from relief 
camps in the north to three sites (Kurtunwarey, Sabíale and Dujuma) in the more arable lands 
of southern Somalia (M ukhtar 1996). Although pastoralists resisted the idea of suddenly 
changing their way of life and engaging in farming livelihood in which they had no 
experience, they were forcibly coerced into accepting their new host environment.
2.2.4 Ogaden War and Refugee Problems
Pursuing its irredentist policy of achieving the creation of a single state - “Greater Somalia” - for 
all ethnic Somali populations, and seeking to reduce rising domestic discontent and justify its 
'security' apparatus, the government in 1977, invaded the Ogaden and Haud region in eastern §
Ethiopia. In the first year of the war, the Somali army captured most parts of the regions until
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the Soviet Union, which had previously supported the Somali government, changed sides and 
extended substantial military support to Ethiopia. The government reacted by cancelling its ties 
with the Soviet Union and ordered 6,000 Soviet army personnel to leave the country. The 
Arab countries supplied arms to the Somali government but had no answer to the technical 
and logistical support provided by the Soviet regime to Ethiopia. One year after the invasion, 
the Ethiopian army launched a major counter-offensive forcing the retreat of the Somali army. 
This defeat had far-reaching political, economic, and social implications for the country. The 
Ogaden war has been interpreted, by some, as the single most im portant turning point for the 
regime for a number of reasons (Lewis 1994; Samatar 1994).
At the outset, the Ogaden war caused a flood of mainly ethnic Somali refugees. By 1979 there 
were officially 1.3 million refugees in the country (Cahill 1986) and probably at least one 
million persons. More than a half of these refugees were settled in the north where one in four 
of the population were refugees. Thirteen camps were set up, mainly in the northwestern region, 
including a large transit camp inside Hargeisa. The massive influx of refugees triggered a 
monumental crisis in the north. The government’s policy of recruiting refugees into the army 
also spurred on tensions between the local people and the refugees. Soon after the arrival of the 
refugees, the government established militia groups among the camps that “consisted mainly of 
untrained, illiterate nomads who were given guns” (Africa Watch 1990: 31). The most 
important of these militia groups were the former fighters of the Western Somali Liberation 
Front (WSLF) which was ostensibly re-established to continue the war of “liberation” in 
Ethiopia, but in fact became part of the governments (numerous) paramilitary groups that 
terrorised the civilian population. The arrival of forced migrants also intensified pressure on 
already limited physical resources and services, further aggravating tensions between the local 
inhabitants and refugees. “Resentment intensified as preferential treatment for the refugees in 
services, jobs, and the allocation of land reduced Isaaks to the status of second-class citizens in 
their own region” (Omaar 1994: 233). Land and property seized from local people were given to 
the refugees and the former fighters of WSLF.
More generally the failed war reduced respect for the army and security police as the asserted 
guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism and therefore increased hostility to them as the 
undoubted enforcers of domestic repression. In parallel - because of their initial victories - 
the army felt let down by the state and their loyalty eroded with some officers believing they 
could do a better job than Barre.
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2.2.5 Formation o f  Opposition Groups and Government Reaction
Som alia’s convincing defeat over the Ogaden war and the subsequent discontent within the 
army, led to an attempted coup in April 1978 by senior military officers from the Majerteen 
clan. Although the government troops crushed the rebellion, executing a number of the 
officers who took part in the attempted coup, the damage had already been done. Some senior 
officers who escaped after the attempted coup formed the first opposition movement called 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which had its base in Ethiopia. With support 
from the Ethiopian army, these groups earned out guerilla warfare across the border. The 
governm ent’s reaction to both the coup attempt and the formation of SSDF was repression 
and vicious reprisals against the Majerteen clan. The government troops destroyed villages 
and earned out a scorched earth policy aimed at depriving support for the SSDF.
The second opposition movement, the Somali National M ovement (SNM) was formed in 
1981 by a group of businessmen, religious leaders, intellectuals, and form er army officers 
largely from the Isaaq clan. Although they maintained their political headquarters in London, 
its military operations were simultaneously based in Ethiopia. Following its formation, the 
government intensified its repressive policies against the Isaaq. To create enmity between 
clans, senior military officers in the Somali army from Isaaq clans were deliberately posted in 
the M ajerteen regions where the government was waging war against local people. In the late 
1980s when most SSDF military officers returned to Somalia, the government sent the former 
SSDF army officers to the north where most commanders were already Majerteens. From 
early in his rule Siad Barre saw the northerners, particularly those from the former 
Protectorate, as a threat to his rule and as he sensed his grasp on power becoming less secure 
his hostility increased.
The Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) was formed in Italy in 1987, by 
which time the service provision role of the state had virtually ceased to function (Green and 
Jamal UNICEF, 1987), but was immediately divided into two rival factions based on different 
sub-clans. The armed faction had alliance with the SNM, which provided arms to General 
A ideed who was to become the leader of the faction. The Ogadeni-led Somali Patriotic 
M ovem ent (SPM) which also worked with the SNM was formed in 1989 following the arrest 
of General Gabyo, the then m inister of defense and the highest ranking Ogadeni in 
government. A few more opposition movements were formed during the civil war in the 
south, but the large number of factions with S-prefixed acronyms appeared after the 
intervention of UNOSOM.
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2.3 War in the North
In May 1988, the SNM launched a surprise attack against government troops stationed in the
two cities of Burao and Hargeisa. The SNM fighters first captured Burao, the second largest 
city in the north and most parts of Hargeisa. The attack followed an unprecedented peace 
accord between the two dictators of Somalia and Ethiopia who both felt challenged by 
growing armed insurgencies. They agreed, in principle, in the first IGADD (Inter­
governmental Authority on Drought and Development) summit, to stop supporting and 
providing military bases to groups opposed to the two governments. It was against this 
background that the SNM decided to launch an all out war. The government’s response to the 
invasion was a wholesale indiscriminate aerial and ground bombardment of all major Isaaq 
towns and villages in the north in what was described as an act of “genocide” (The Guardian 
1989). This savage attack “was seen, probably rightly, as an attack on the whole of Isaaq 
people, and it succeeded as no amount of SNM  propaganda had done, in uniting the Isaaq 
behind the SNM ” (Gilkes 1993: 7).
The arrival of US arms shipment for the regime at the most critical month of the war helped 
the government troops to supply arms and ammunition to the Ogaden refugees, who 
ultimately fought alongside the government forces. United Sates General Accounting Office 
(1989: 9) report notes that:
Lethal US military assistance consisting of 1,200 M16 automatic rifles and 2 
million rounds of M16 ammunition, plus 300,000 rounds of 30 caliber and
500,000 rounds of 50 caliber ammunition.... arrived on June 4 at the port of 
Berbera and was used by the government at a critical point in the conflict.... 
During the period, the Somali government supplied arms to an unprecedented 
number of refugees to fight SNM.
Describing the role of the large refugees in the war Lewis (1990: 59) observes Ogadeni 
refugees “have been conscripted as a paramilitary militia to fight the SNM and ... encouraged 
to take over the remains of Isaaq shops and houses in what are now ghost towns. Thus, those 
who were received as refugee guests have supplanted their Isaaq hosts, many of whom - in 
this bitterly ironic turn of fate - are now refugees in the Ogaden” .
The interplay of increased repression, failed military adventurism, near abandonment of civil 
governance to finance the army and other security services, growing dissent increasingly 
violently put down drove the Barre regime into endgame. The Somaliland war could not be 
won and com pleted the bankrupting of the state financially and morally. It also wore down
A
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the army opening the way for the later Southern risings! Because Barre had first created and 
then eroded the m odem unified’ Somali state it fell with him.
2.4 Rebirth of Somaliland
Siad Barre’s forces were defeated when the USC took control of Mogadishu and the SNM 
captured Berbera, Hargeisa and Burao in January 1991. In February 1991, the USC 
announced that it had formed an interim government headed by Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu 
without any consultation with the SNM and SPM which were allies in the war. This was 
followed by the declaration of the independence of Somaliland on 18 May 1991. The decision 
to repudiate the 1960 Act of Union ’ was taken at a Grand National conference held in the city 
of Burao. It was taken part by SNM Central Committee and also by the territorial council of 
elders representing all clans in the north, including non-Isaaq who did not support the SNM.
The decision unilaterally to declare independence was taken primarily because of popular 
local support for restoring the short-lived independence of Somaliland and to restore the 
public service, public administration, law and order, public services structures of the late 
British colonial period as the basis for a modem territorial state linked to the historic elders 
council as a representative and legitimating foundation.
Barre’s northern m ilitary viceroy was General Morgan - his son-in-law- whose sanguinary 
tactics further deepened the divide between the north and the south. As a result, “the scale 
and ferocity of the war in the north had nurtured a visceral hatred not only of the regime but 
of everything it represented, including the union” (Omaar 1994: 234). Secession was not one 
of the aims of the SNM  but was forced by a strong broad-based popular opinion in favor of 
independence and a total rejection of southern politics.
The Grand Shir in Burao also appointed Abdirahman ‘Tuur’, the then chairman of the SNM, 
as an interim president for two years and asked him to form a government. There was a 
widespread fear that SNM would retaliate against other clans who supported Siad Barre 
during the war in the north, but this did not happen and ultimately fostered a renewed 
environment of trust and cooperation between clans. The importance of this unexpected 
cooperation between Isaaq and non-Isaaq clans was shown by the fact that elders from the 
Gadabuursi clan played a key role in local reconciliation conference aimed at resolving 
disputes between Isaaq clans. This was particularly encouraged by the decision to disband the 
SNM, an essentially Isaaq movement, and to replace it with an inclusive administration that 
had a fair representation of all clans. While all the other military movements established to
  «
3 W hich had never been accepted in the Northwest and was arguably devoid o f any legal validity (See Green,
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overthrow Siad Barre, with many later additions, still exist and remain to varying degrees 
military focused, the SNM ceased to exist as an organization in the north when the first 
administration was formed as a means to and a result of creating a cross clan territorial state.
This divergent evolution in the north had historical roots. Colonial rule under the British had 
been clan conscious but relatively even-handed with integrated civil, municipal police and 
armed services. Further pre-colonial states under Isaaq leadership did achieve relatively 
harmonious relations with other clans because they perceived this as vital to security around 
Berbera and to access to the sea. That access was crucial to highland-Arabian peninsula trade 
and therefore also valuable to Berbera as its key port. That set of trade relations- which was 
key to the pastoral and commercial sectors - was continued under British rule, but was 
constricted and suppressed by Barre and also Mengistu. Since 1992 it has been revived with 
overt state support not only by the Somaliland Republic but also the new Ethiopian 
government which perceives Berbera as its number two port. The trade pattern also dictates 
the simple fact that the NW economy has never had substantial economic ties with the South 
(other than tax exactions spent largely in the South) but has been relatively integrated 
internally and with Ethiopia, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen.
In the first nine months there was relative peace and most of the refugees in Ethiopia returned 
to the country. With little support, people started reconstructing what was left of their 
properties and businesses and there were signs of economic recovery. However, the ‘Tuur’ 
administration, which was facing a formidable task of rebuilding social, economic, political 
and physical infrastructure from scratch, failed to develop effective rehabilitation policies and 
priorities. In particular, it failed to develop demobilization programm es for thousands of war 
veterans most of whom had been in the bush for about a decade. In the early 1992 factional 
fighting broke out in Burao and Berbera, but both of these conflicts were successfully 
resolved through peaceful negotiation brokered by council of elders. In 1994 a major national 
reconciliation conference was held in Borama which adopted a framework for peacemaking 
and rebuilding a foundation for a new system of governance.
The Southern evolution was very different. No state - unitary or confederal -  emerged. 
Neither the coalition dominated by General Aideed in M ogadishu South, the lower Shibelle 
and -  later -  Baidoa nor that led by Ali Mahdi M ohamm ed in M ogadishu North and the 
middle and upper Shibelle was able to secure military or political victory and a number of 
significant areas were controlled by local warlords allied with neither or fell into pure 
banditry. The USA/UN intervention did limit conflict for a time but did not resolve it and
1995).
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eventually withdrew as a result of its resurgence. Subsequent negotiations have failed to 
reach a modus vivendi among the military fractions -  especially in the key Mogadishu area -  
and are unlikely to do so as long as peacelords (elders, merchants) are largely excluded 
(Mogadishu North is a partial exception, as probably is Bardhere) because historically 
warlords neither led during peace nor negotiated settlements and therefore present warlords 
have a vested interest against peace.
The Northeast (Bosaso) has evolved in an intermediate way. Isolated by desert from 
populated areas in both Somaliland and the South it has largely escaped repetitive violence 
and become a displaced Mujertin haven. Its port and its highway link to Mogadishu were 
rebuilt late in the 1980s as part of a hearts and minds campaign following earlier repression. 
W hile econom ically irrelevant prior to the war the transport infrastructure has sparked an 
entrepot commercial boom town for M ogadishu because of insecurity there. While normally 
fairly peaceful Bosaso has -  partly because its economy and much of its population are 
temporary and would be wrenched away by peace -  a leadership which has made little 
attempt to build up either civil administration or public services delivery capacity.
3. Local Level Effects
3.1 Somaliland
3.1.1 Loss o f  Life and Displacement o f  Population
The num ber of deaths has been estimated at around 100,000 in the northern towns (The 
Guardian 1993). Up to 50,000 people are believed to have lost their lives in the capital city, 
Hargeisa, as a result of summary executions, aerial bombardments and ground attacks carried 
out by government troops (Bake 1993). Gersony (1989), who conducted one of the first 
investigations for the State Department, maintains that the troops conducted what appears to 
have been systematic attacks targeted at civilian population. Some of the more brutal acts 
occurred in rural villages and were carried out by special troops known as the "Isaaq 
Exterm inating Wing" (Dabar-goynta lsaaqa) who were purported to have been recruited 
from among the Ogaden refugees. They destroyed or poisoned wells - vital for the pastoral 
econom y - seized livestock and burned down entire villages to deprive the rural population of 
its basic means of livelihood (Amnesty International 1988). Herders and farmers, in 
particular, were targeted as they were perceived as a support base for the SNM. This 
w idespread destruction was carried out in the spirit of General M organ's infamous "death 
letter" which advocated scorched earth policies, including the destruction of villages in the 
area between the main towns where government troops were based and the Ethiopian border.
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Within a few months of the outbreak of the war, virtually the entire Isaaq population was 
displaced and forced to seek refuge in eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti, while some became 
internally displaced in southern Somalia. The scale of mass displacement is indicated by the 
fact that by August 1989 up to 361,000 refugees were registered in five camps in eastern 
Ethiopia alone (Toole and Bhatia 1992) while many more stayed with their relatives in the 
Haud region which is a home to Isaaq nomads.
3.1.2 Loss o f  Livelihoods
Although the exact number of animals lost as a result of the war is not yet known, it is 
estimated that more then half of the country’s total livestock population was killed either 
directly or indirectly (SEPHA 1991). The high number of livestock losses resulted from 
attacks by government troops who targeted watering points and villages while seizing large 
numbers of animals. The confiscation of animals took place even before the outbreak of war 
as many nomads were accused of being SNM sympathisers. The troops also destroyed water 
sources by blowing up or draining water reservoirs. In some areas open wells were poisoned, 
while others were contaminated with corpses (Africa Watch 1990). The extensive planting of 
mines in rural areas was also partly responsible for animal losses. An estimated one million 
mines had been planted in Somaliland. The intention of the government’s strategy of planting 
anti-personnel land mines extensively was to terrorize the civilian population. (African Rights 
and Mines Advisory Group December 1993: 19) note that:
This was a logical if grotesque development of the military strategy of total 
destruction. Many streets, markets, public buildings, clinics and open spaces 
(such as football pitches) were mined. M ost of the approaches to the town were 
mined. M ines were placed inside houses; either in the courtyards or inside the 
dwellings themselves, to deter people from returning to their homes. Some of 
these mines were booby-trapped.
Another contributing factor was the distress sale of livestock by pastoralists. A sudden fall of 
livestock prices during the war (due, in part, to the disruption of the export trade to Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen as well as Ethiopia) led them to sell higher numbers of animals to meet 
their subsistence requirements. The livestock markets in eastern Ethiopia were flooded with 
animals and the terms of trade between livestock and food grain fell sharply. The pressure to 
sell or slaughter more and more animals, including breeding stock, had increased because the 
number of people to be supported from a given herd size had increased by the refugee influx.
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The war also disrupted the merchant-based network that transm itted remittances from the 
Arab States.
Crop production was even more devastated by the war since all farmers were forced to 
abandon cultivation for the four years of conflict. When most farmers returned in 1991 they 
were unable to resume cultivation because of land mines and the lack of seeds and oxen to 
plant their farms; it was not until 1992 that some cultivation resumed. In some of the most 
important agricultural areas of Gabiley and Arabsiyo, the land was so densely mined that 
farmers were not even able to graze their animals. In the small scale irrigated farms, 
equipment such as pumps and pipes were looted, and wells and tree crops destroyed. For 
instance, in Arabsiyo, a town 20 miles west of the capital Hargeisa and one of the most 
important horticultural centres, ninety per cent of its horticultural farms were destroyed.
3.1.3 Social and Economic Costs
Another effect of the war was the destruction of market centres and the mining of transport 
routes that virtually shut down trade. This was accompanied by the closure of the Red Sea 
port of Berbera for animal exports from the second half of 1988 to 1991.4 An average of 1.2 
million animals used to be exported per annum through Berbera port [Ahmed, 1994 #401]. 
Because market exchange was central to the survival of rural households, the closure of 
Berbera port and the collapse of local markets for meat had a devastating effect, forcing many 
to dispose of large numbers of their animals. The lack of a government or a dependable bulk 
buyer caused the Somali shilling to lose value against foreign currencies. This was further 
exacerbated as some of the Somali faction leaders printed their own shillings. As a result, the 
exchange rate fell from 200 So Sh to the US dollar in late 1988 to 8,000 So Sh in mid 1992.
Ironically, the com m unity insurance and transfer systems that had originally played important 
roles in the collective coping strategies of households, triggered social crisis during the war. 
There was a sudden increase in the social obligations, forcing many households to sell their 
assets. The blood money payment, for instance, which played an important role in preventing 
and containing localised conflicts, also forced many households to liquidate some or all of 
their productive assets. Because neither the SNM nor the Ethiopian authorities controlled the 
refugee camps there was massive violence and lawlessness, due in part, to the proliferation of 
light weapons. As a result many deaths and injures were attributed to freelance bandits. The 
absence of central authority meant that these had to be settled through traditional means of 
compensations. Because of a fear that any internal conflict would hinder their common
4 This was the first time this port was closed since the early pre-colonial periods when it became established as
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struggle against the regime, the council of elders had constituted emergency laws demanding 
any outstanding blood money to be settled within a short period of time. In normal times, 
families were given sufficient time to settle any outstanding blood money. Although the 
system survived during the war, arrears in blood money payments forced many households to 
default on payments for the first time, jeopardising the functioning of the whole system.
A further social obligation which households had to meet during the war was the contribution 
to the war effort. Two types of contributions were required from the individual households: a 
male member was required to join the SNM forces in addition to making a payment of one 
sheep (or its equivalent in cash) at least once a year. These obligations were strictly applied 
before the war in 1988 when SNM relied heavily on the Isaaq nomads in the Haud region for 
the recruitment of fighters.3 A further requirement from rural households was the ownership 
o f rifles, made necessary due to deteriorating security. Having sustained heavy losses as a 
result of attacks by government troops who sometimes crossed the border between the two 
countries, most of the households were forced to purchase their own guns to defend 
themselves.
The crisis had a differential impact on men and women among the rural households. There 
was a significant increase in the number and type of tasks perform ed by women during the 
crisis. As men became increasingly involved in the community level activities associated with 
the war, women were forced to do tasks that had traditionally been the domain of men. As a 
result of the crisis, women took responsibility for a whole range of new activities such as 
queuing up and collecting food rations, fetching water from distant sources and engaging in 
petty trading to supplement their incomes. However, two types of activities were particularly 
dem anding and time consuming. The first was obtaining food rations from the refugee camps 
where they queued up for long hours on the distribution days. In the largest refugee camp of 
Hartisheik, the system of food distribution was exceptionally poor and excessively 
bureaucratic, creating particular problems for women who were already stretched by other 
demands.
The other new demanding activity for which women were responsible was collecting water; 
an activity that also took up a significant part of their time. Because of a severe water 
shortage in the refugee camps where households were receiving as little as one litre per day 
per person for very long periods (Shoham, Rivers et al. 1989), women hauled water from
the trade centre for nomads.
5 The SNM relied heavily on the recruitment of fighters from nomads. Locally known as the Deaf Brigade (Gaas 
Dliegoole) because of their lack o f formal military training, they were nevertheless the best fighters in the
movement.
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distant dams and ponds. In some households, women were spending as much as half of their 
time hauling water from these sources to their homes. As a consequence they had less time to 
devote to im portant activities such as child-care. This problem was accentuated by increased 
illness among household members, particularly those who lived in the camps, which further 
reduced the amount of labour available for household activities. In addition, women were 
often subjected to increased human insecurity due to the threat of physical violence and rape, 
though, there were few cases compared those suffered by women refugees in Kenya and 
southern Somalia.
3.2 Somalia
3.2.1 Famine and loss o f Life and Livelihoods
When Siad Barre was defeated his troops regrouped and established a base in his hometown 
of Bardhere. A ideed’s forces pursued and as a result the Southern civil war which started in 
M ogadishu spread to most of rural villages and towns in the south. Both Siad Barre and 
Aideed’s m ilitia ransacked villages and towns in the agricultural area of Bay. The remnants of 
Barre’s forces maintained a strong base in the inter-riverine region for nearly a year 
destroying villages and crops. Animals were killed or stolen, forcing hundreds of farmers to 
flee to the regional capital Baidoa which later became the epicentre of the 1991-92 famine. 
With exception of Mogadishu this region suffered the most serious devastation.
The rebel group that represented clans in the inter-riverine regions, Somali Democratic 
M ovement (SDM ) which was just formed was not sufficiently armed to protect their people. 
Siad Barre marginalised Rehenwein people and unlike other southern clans there were very 
few senior military officials in the government troops and therefore they did not have the kind 
of heavy weapons other factions and Siad Barre’s forces had. “The inter-riverine people were 
trapped between Aideed’s forces in the north, Barre’s in southwest, and M organ’s - Barre’s 
son-in law - in the south, in what became known as the ‘triangle of death’. Baidoa, the capital 
of the region became also known as the ‘city of the walking dead’ [Mukhtar, 1996 #341: 
551].
At the height of the civil war in 1991-92 a major drought hit the area leading to a devastating 
famine which killed between 300,000 and 500,000 [Mukhtar, 1996 #341] [Thakur, 1994 
#380] and affected as many as 3 million. The large number of deaths resulted from outbreak 
of infectious diseases as thousands of people gathered relief camps in and around major 
towns. Baidoa, the capital of Bay region, was particularly devastated by the famine partly 
because A ideed’s faction deliberately prevented relief food from reaching there. “Whenever
24
vehicles of the United Nations headed for the inter-riverine region, Aideed m ilitia 
methodically looted them en route. Finally, when the UN/US command in desperation 
decided to airlift supplies to Baidoa, Aideed militia captured Baidoa Airport, and imposed a 
fee of $5,000 per flight, taking a percentage of the food as well” [Mukhtar, 1996 #341: 551].
Both in isolated rural areas and in urban displaced person camps infant and young child 
mortality was horrifyingly -  over 100% a year for several months in many areas. As a result 
Somalia has an abnormally low 5 to 10 year old age cadre and when peace is restored is likely 
to face a birth and 0 - 5  age group explosion in the context of very poor maternal and child 
health capacity.
3.2.2 Population Displacem ent and Economic Costs
The war in the south created a huge displacement of Somalis. It uprooted an estimated 1.7 
million people, over one third of the entire probable Southern population6 which either fled to 
the neighboring countries of Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti or became internally 
displaced (The United Nations 1996). As many as a quarter of a million people from rural 
areas in the south poured into Mogadishu where aid agencies had set up relief camps. As the 
war in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas intensified most of the city residents and internal 
refugees were displaced again creating massive flows of moving populations. Heavy fighting 
along the surrounding State borders and the routes via Baidoa and Kismayo to them prevented 
most of them from fleeing to Ethiopia and Kenya.
Virtually all of the services and institutions that had survived the radical erosion of the late 
Barre years collapsed totally in the ensuing civil war and anarchy. Key infrastructure, 
essential for econom ic activities, such as water and power generators, refineries, air and sea 
ports, telecommunication installation, bridges and parts of most tarmac road were destroyed 
or ceased to function because of non-maintenance which has been an endemic Somalian 
problem even in peacetime and without crippling budget constraints. Schools and hospitals 
were targeted and most of them were destroyed during the initial factional fighting in 
Mogadishu and surrounding areas. What was not destroyed in the war was looted. For 
instance, M ogadishu, which had a recently com pleted modem electricity network, was 
completely stripped. Even underground cables and pipe-systems were ripped out and exported 
to the Gulf. Factories and industrial machinery that were not destroyed in war were 
'  dismantled and sold as scrap in the neighboring countries.
6 While the Barre regim e in 1997-8 claimed a population o f over 8 m illion the actual (Swedish managed) census
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Moreover, the war had a disastrous environmental impact. In addition to environmental 
damage caused by refugees and internally displaced people in large camps, there has been 
widespread illegal dumping of industrial and hazardous waste in the Somali territorial waters 
mainly by Italian firms that had contracts with the regime. In Somaliland there are hundreds 
of highly unstable and leaking Russian missiles scattered outside the towns of Hargeisa and 
Berbera. As many as 240 Sam-3 and Sam-3 missiles were left to rot outside what used to be 
the Soviet military base in Berbera [Times 1993 ]. Since the breakdown of law and order 
companies engaged in exporting charcoal had burned large areas of forest (sometimes 
accidentally). Perhaps the greatest continuing cost is that of past widespread, indiscriminate 
and largely undilineated land mining.
4. UN and NGO Interventions
The media coverage of the crisis played a key role in triggering an international response. What 
was particularly influential was the extensive television coverage of starving Somali children, 
which brought live pictures to homes around the world. However, the media coverage of the 
disaster started late. The first reports of impending major disaster by the very few NGOs that 
remained in the country when Siad Barre was overthrown did not get sufficiently wide coverage 
and the development of the crisis did not receive the attention it warranted from the 
international community. The decision by the US and UN to intervene was taken at a late stage 
of the famine and the launch of the large-scale relief operation was tragically late.
The agencies faced a multitude of problems in delivering humanitarian aid. There was a serious 
breakdown of law and order resulting in insecurity, lawlessness, and violence that prevented the 
delivery of aid to affected people. This continued even after the deployment of the US-led 
troops. In fact the first 500 Pakistani troops which had arrived much earlier than other troops 
even required -  or at any rate hired - militia protection for their own security. As a result, 
agencies were forced to rely on expensive armed protection by militia to distribute emergency 
relief. For example, CARE, which was responsible for the delivery of food supplies, spent $US 
100,000 per month on bodyguards to carry out its relief distribution activities (Hillmore 1995). 
ICRC had a much higher protection bill of $US 100,000 per week which it paid to factional 
militias to provide security for the distribution of emergency relief (Prendergast 1997). Not only 
was this an expensive way of providing relief, but by paying large amounts of money to militia, 
the agencies supported the war economy and discouraged militia disarmament (Bradbury 1995). 
The UN agencies also paid fees and gave contracts believed to be worth millions of dollars to 
factions, which played a major role in shoring up the warlords’ patronage system and sustaining
suggests 5.5 -  4 in the South, 1.5 in the North.
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the war economy.7 They have also strengthened the financial flow mechanics of the khat Trade 
by using its wholesale merchants as Somali shilling provides/lenders repaid in USA dollars in 
Nairobi and Djibouti.
There was a general lack of preparedness and information about the disaster, which contributed 
to the delays in launching the intervention. Only a handful of agencies including the ICRC, Save 
the Children Fund and Medecins Sans Frontieres stayed in the country when all the UN 
agencies and most NGOs withdrew from the country after the overthrow of Siad Barre. The 
long absence of most UN agencies8 during the critical period of the crisis meant that they lacked 
extensive and accurate information necessary to organise and carry out large-scale humanitarian 
operations. It was difficult to collect detailed information, but most agencies even failed to 
consult the few NGOs already in the country that closely followed the development of the 
famine. For example, in 1991 the Save The Children Fund, which conducted a detailed food 
security survey in rural Somaliland, found that there were no famine conditions and 
recommended against emergency food aid delivery (Holt and Lawrence 1192). Perhaps unaware 
of this survey, Care International and WFP imported large quantities of food and flooded local 
markets in Somaliland with cheap food without prior warning to local traders9 (Ahmed 1994). 
Not only did this force many traders out of business but it also destabilised local food markets 
and household entitlements.At that point in time scarcities and severe malnutrition were 
concentrated in urban areas and among displaced persons.
Several other agencies also proposed to open feeding centres in and around Hargeisa, but were 
refused permission by the local authorities. In part this represents the general international 
failure to perceive that in many respects, including food production, commerce, and climate, the 
northwest is quite different from the southern coastal riverine and pastoral districts. It also 
illustrated the greater attention to civil governance and producer/trader issues which has 
characterised post Barre governance in Somaliland.
The collapse of physical, institutional and state infrastructure and the complexity of the conflict 
made the delivery of humanitarian assistance exceedingly problematic. Intervening in a country 
without a State structure was something new to the agencies that were used to dealing, more or 
less, with central authorities. Moreover, the operational guidelines of agencies were more
7 It also provided part of a base for the emergence o f a new capitalist sector- where the most notable figure is Ali 
Osman Ato who first financed General Aideed in return for protection but subsequently has sought to play a more 
independent role. His successful primitive accumulation has given him -  like other em ergent merchant capitalists - 
an increasing pecuniary interest in stability, law and order, and wider territorial access.
h N evertheless, a few agencies, including UNICEF, returned fairly rapidly to the northw est and maintained a 
lim ited M ogadishu presence via Somali staff.
9 This was exacerbated by the fact that large quantities o f food looted from Care International stores which were 
released on to the markets
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applicable to natural disasters than to complex emergencies that require creative and flexible 
programming under conditions of continuing conflict. Questions over impartiality, 
accountability and appropriate codes of conduct added to the confusion. This was a nearly 
unprecedented intervention (in terms of scale) even for those agencies such as the ICRC and 
UNICEF that had a long experience of working in conflict situations. For the ICRC, it was their 
largest operation since the Second World W ar (Netherlands Development Co-operation 1994). 
There was also a general lack of co-ordination both within and between the UN and other 
agencies. Neither the objectives or mandates of the intervention nor the roles and 
responsibilities of the hundred different agencies were made sufficiently clear. This often 
resulted in “overlapping, poor information sharing, conflicting (even though rarely so 
intended) initiatives, very costly duplicative logistical and overhead systems and a degree of 
institutional self-promotion, autonomy protection and competition” (Green 1995: 4). Matters 
were made worse by a near total loss of both written and human historic records of previous 
Somali experiences. UN agency records were lost when the Mogadishu UN compound was 
overrun and virtually no staff with pre-1991 Somali experience were re-deployed in the 1992- 
1993 re-entry. Indeed the central UN civil operation under UNDP seemed to view prior 
territorial experience with disdain, so few were its hirings of persons with specialised 
knowledge and/or work experience in the territory in which it proposed and attempted to create 
a proxy civil governance network.
The multitude of agencies with widely different mandates, structures, procedures, operations 
and capacity (if any) to operate in Somalia or, indeed, any context of anarchic violence 
complicated the co-ordination of the intervention in an already complex disaster (Netherlands 
Development Co-operation 1994: 18). Many NGOs were in the country primarily because of the 
presence of the media whom they regarded as an opportunity they could not afford to miss (in 
an effort to mobilise name-recognition and funds). Doubtless they were concerned with saving 
lives but also with bolstering their budgets via increased government and UN agencies transfers 
and public donations. The high profile media coverage of the crisis also created other problems, 
which undoubtedly affected the quality and delivery of humanitarian assistance. For example, 
Netherlands Development Co-operation (1994: 303) found that during the emergency most 
agencies concentrated more on presenting their activities in a positive way to the media leading 
to “a high level of media management” than with the services per se.
The UN first became involved in January 1992 when the Security Council passed a resolution 
which, inter alia , called for an increase in the humanitarian aid provided to Somalia. At first, 
most of the faction leaders agreed to co-operate with the UN and accepted the deployment of 
500-strong peacekeeping force. However, serious delays resulted in the postponement of troop 
deployment. As the situation deteriorated and the delivery of humanitarian assistance became
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increasingly difficult, the Security Council adopted resolution 794 which authorised the UN to 
use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia”. This led to the establishment of “Operation Restore Hope” which 
initially had the limited objective of providing a secure environment for the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. However, following the death of 23 Pakistani soldiers of the multi-national 
UN team in June 1993, the Security Council passed another resolution which authorised the UN 
to take all necessary measures to arrest and detain those responsible. This led to open war 
between Aideed’s militia and the UN and US troops.
The operation turned into a multi-mandate intervention involving peace-making, peacekeeping 
and peace-enforcement operations that all with conflicted one another. A Life and Peace 
Institute (1995: 4) study points out that:
The Operation’s mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process and 
was open to myriad interpretations. The mandate changed from protecting the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and maintaining a ‘secure 
environment’, to capturing a leader of one of the factions at one stage and, later, 
to encouraging negotiations with that same leader. These mandates were, in 
many respects, contradictory.... As a consequence UNOSOM was bedevilled 
with disagreements among the various players
Earlier in the intervention, as demobilisation and control of weapons was deemed essential, the 
UN’s first Special Representative, Mohamud Sahnoun, initiated a food-for-arms programme 
aimed at reducing the widespread availability and use of light weapons (UNIDIR 1995). This 
was an important initiative which had wide support among Somalis, including most faction 
leaders and elders (some war leaders did not support it nor did young men who saw the gun as 
their only capital asset and ticket to ‘productive’ self-employment). However, this approach to 
controlling arms was soon replaced by a new strategy that suggested disarming the militia by 
force as the only way of curbing the widespread availability of weapons. But this was also 
abandoned when the UN troops met fierce resistance from faction leaders.
With an annual expenditure of $1.5 billion the intervention was the most expensive 
humanitarian operation ever undertaken (Lewis and Mayall 1996). In its evaluation of the UN's 
intervention in Somalia, Life and Peace Institute (1995: 14) finds that “far too little was 
achieved too late and the lives of countless Somalis, mainly women and young children, were 
lost”. It argues that agencies failed to understand and appreciate the root causes and dynamics of 
the complex political emergency. Its focus and concentration on emergency relief without 
allocating adequate resources for rehabilitation and reconstruction also limited the effectiveness
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of the intervention. Food distribution was not accompanied by any meaningful rehabilitation 
of the economy, key institutions or infrastructure. Lewis and Mayall (1996: 123-4) note that 
“of US $1.6 billion allocated for UNOSOM ’s military operations in the period up to the end of 
1993, it is estimated that only 4 per cent will work its way into the Somali economy, mostly into 
the hands of the warlords and other operators whose financial activities, subsidised by 
UNOSOM, have distorted, perhaps irrevocably, the Somali economy”.
The concentration of the humanitarian aid in and around Mogadishu further limited its effect. 
This centralised intervention drew people from rural areas to main cities and urban towns where 
relief camps had been set up”(Netherlands Development Co-operation 1994). Moreover, despite 
the rhetoric of capacity building, UN agencies and international NGOs largely implemented the 
emergency relief activities with very little or no involvement of local actors and, especially, of 
mosque and neighbourhood based social ones. The international agencies were, on the whole, 
sceptical about the capacity of indigenous NGOs on quasi Northwestern lines and simply 
overlooked the rest of the domestic social sector. They perceived the local NGOs -  not always 
correctly - as clan-based contractors (Abdillahi 1997). No constructive attempts were made to 
use local networks and mosque-related groups as channels, bases, and sources of legitimacy 
despite their omnipresence, local and national respect, and proven ability to mobilise domestic 
resources. Nor was account taken of the fact that clan elders constituted genuine, historically 
rooted community channels, and that strengthening them would have enhanced the near non­
existent leverage of peace lords against war lords while hiring militias as guards had the reverse 
effect. By all indications, the humanitarian operation was a top down intervention that was 
delivered with little or no consideration of local participation. It displayed little or no 
understanding of Somali social and political patterns and dynamics. By accident more than 
design it revalued/stabilised the (Barre) Somali currency to about SS 2,500 to the USA $ by 
buying large quantities of a diminishing (wear/tear but no new printings), a situation more or 
less sustained since the demise of UNOSOM.
There were, however, a number of successful outcomes of the intervention. The ICRC’s 
humanitarian relief work, for example, at the height of the famine, provided wet and dry rations 
to over one million people throughout southern regions of the country. This is believed to have 
averted starvation of tens of thousands of people (Netherlands Development Co-operation 
1994). Among the positive aspects of ICRC’s operation included: clear mandate; extensive local 
experience; the existence of a national counterpart (the Somali Red Crescent); and political 
impartiality accepted by the local people (ibid.). In contrast, UNOSOM ’s operation was seen by 
most Somalis as a party in the conflict following its war with one of the factions and the death 
of many innocent civilians in its war with the militia. According to Amnesty International 
(1994: 20) UNOSOM troops used fire indiscriminately and many of the civilians killed in the
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war “seem to have been victims of the use of lethal force in breach of human rights and 
international humanitarian law obligations” .10
A
5. Conflict Resolution and Peace Building
5.1 Traditional Peace-making in Somaliland
A series of grassroots reconciliation conferences have been held in a num ber of towns since 
early 1992 when two politically motivated armed conflicts took place in the cities of Burao 
and Berbera. The elders embarked on a long process of peace-building endeavour aimed at 
settling all major outstanding issues between communities across the country. Conflict 
resolution in the north has always been the responsibility of elders who have authority to 
represent their clans. Unlike the tribal chiefs found in many African societies, elders in 
Somaliland “are chosen by virtue of personal attributes such as age, expertise in the political 
arts of compromise and persuasion, powers of oratory, skill as a poet, religious knowledge, 
piety, wealth, generosity, courage and a reputation for fairness” (Omaar 1994: 234). That is 
not all old men are elders nor, at least recently, are all elders aged. The council of elders is 
known Guurti who have joint responsibilities for conflict resolution. The assemblies promote 
democratic participation and their deliberations are held publicly. Because of their dual 
kinship, women who are described as “clan ambassadors” play a key role in the mediation of 
disputes during conflicts. Sometimes they become the only means of com m unication between 
warring groups.
Soon after the ending of the war significant differences emerged within Isaaq clans and 
between some Isaaq clans and other clans such as Dulbahante and W arsangeli in Erigavo as a 
result of disputes over land, grazing rights, use of water points, properties, stolen vehicles and 
road access for trade. During the war when Isaaqs who make up half of Erigavo’s population 
were displaced, their properties and land were taken over by other clans. This was reversed 
after the end of the war, creating dispute between the communities (Farah and Lewis 1997). 
Early efforts of reconciliation therefore concentrated on Erigavo and eventually resolved the 
disputes. The elders also managed to resolve the conflict in Burao and Berbera that resulted 
from differences within the Isaaq clan family. These local level peace-m aking efforts have 
reduced the tensions between clans, restored trust and harmonious relations between 
communities, increased interactions and trade between clans and reestablished the traditional 
means of resolving disputes (Omaar 1994; Farah and Lewis 1997). In some areas joint 
committees were formed to resolve minor disputes and prevent freelance banditry. These
A  _____________________________
10 Admittedly the tactical use of human screens of  women and children in front of  militia posed dilemmas for
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committees act as a rapid deployment force in disputes involving acts of violence, theft of 
animals, and sim ilar incidences that usually start local conflicts. They also ensure that peace 
agreements between communities are observed.
It is worth underlining that the Gadabuursi (non-Isaaq) elders from Borama played a crucial 
role in the settlem ent of this conflict (Farah and Lewis 1997). This initiative helped rebuild 
the trust of the clans destroyed by the war and the clan manipulation of the old regime. In the 
post-conflict environm ent of suspicion and mistrust even within communities of the same 
clans, the neutral status of Gadabuursi elders who are renowned for peace making was an 
important asset in these reconciliation efforts. It was in recognition of this and their role in 
finding settlements to the local disputes that the Council of Elders decided to hold the Grand 
National reconciliation conference in Borama. Some 150 voting delegates and a further 150 
observers and advisers representing all clans attended the conference.
The conference established a framework for resolving future disputes, created a constitutional 
structure for the country, set up the foundation for a different system of governance structure 
(a blend of W estem -style state and the traditional governance institution) and replaced the 
first the administration with a new government headed by M ohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the 
first head of the independent Somaliland state in 1960 and the last prime minister of Somalia 
before the coup in 1969. It established a framework for peaceful co-existence without 
domination by any one clan or group, using the time-tested process of traditional conflict 
resolution. This contrasts sharply with the UN-brokered reconciliation conferences in the 
south. The national conference took place only after a series of grassroots level reconciliation 
meetings have resolved all major outstanding issues and restored the trust between the 
communities. This gave the elders an opportunity to spend most of their time in Borama to 
discuss issues concerning national security and reconstituting governance structures. The 
Borama conference lasted much longer than was scheduled as elders argued they were 
“guided by the Somali proverb: ‘if you want to dismantle a hedge, remove one thorn bush at a 
tim e’”(Omaar 1994: 235).
There has been no foreign involvement in the peace-making conferences in Somaliland. 
While the UN sponsored conferences were highly publicized, the grassroots peace-making 
process was out of the limelight. With the exception of some very limited logistical support 
for the Borama conference, the UN and other agencies did not provide support for these 
successful local level initiatives. In fact the UN was particularly opposed to the Borama 
conference. Om aar (1993: 45) notes that “instead of supporting such initiatives, the UN
UNOSOM.
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nearly derailed the Borama meeting by announcing plans to send forces to Somaliland” 
during UNOSOM operations and was barely dissuaded by warnings they would have to fight 
their way step by step from Berbera following an opposed landing. Even UNOSOM recoiled 
at the probable press response to that kind of 'peace keeping' and 'humanitarian assistance'.
5.2 Forging a Settlement: UN-Style Reconciliations in Somalia
In contrast to the traditional peace-making process in Somaliland, the UN has organised more 
than 10 highly publicised and costly reconciliation conferences since 1993. Faction leaders 
(dominantly warlords not elders and/or merchants i.e. peace lords) who have played the 
central role in these reconciliation conferences have signed agreements in every meeting. But 
all collapsed soon after they finished, sometimes within hours. The key features of this style 
of peace making are fundamentally different from local peace-making techniques used in 
regions such as Somaliland and the Northeast. Almost all reconciliation conferences were 
held outside the country with agendas often set by their sponsors. At least two conferences 
have been held in each of the neighbouring countries - Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen. 
M ore recently one was held in Egypt. A major problem with these high profile peace-making 
conferences is that legitimate representatives of the affected-communities such as elders, 
merchants, women’s groups and others who have a genuine interest in peace making are not 
included. Furthermore, cost considerations have often determined the duration of these 
conferences; consequently they always have very short with fixed timetables instead of 
adopting the open and flexible approach of the local ones. W hilst the Borama conference 
lasted four months, the longest UN-brokered conference lasted one and a half week.
Although these conferences have been referred to as “peace-making” and “reconciliation” , 
they have often been political conferences aimed at reconstituting a central state led by 
warlords. Instead of working with local structures, the UN has somehow become obsessed with 
the re-establishment of a central state on terms set by the international donors. With their focus 
on “quick fix” solutions, these conferences “faltered where it mattered - on the ground. 
Problems were to be ‘solved’ before UN officials understood the nature of the problem” (Omaar 
1994: 236). The first reconciliation conference in Addis Ababa in January 1993 was held less 
than a month after the UN troops arrived in Mogadishu.
One observer commented acidly that both UNOSOM and militia leaders spoke of forging peace 
but UNOSOM apparently had metal working and the militia leaders fraudulent documents in 
mind -  both meanings of the verb "to forge" but hardly similar ones. In practice the militia 
leaders appeared to view the conferences as devices to reduce UNOSOM pressures on them and
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ultimately to wear it down to the point of leaving in despair. To that extent UNOSOM peace 
forging was a success -  for warlords wanting neither UNOSOM nor peace.
6. Rehabilitation
6.1 Economic and Livelihood Rehabilitation
With the exception of Somaliland and the northeast region" there has been and still is very 
little rehabilitation work and international aid is still largely confined to emergency 
assistance. Reconstruction efforts suffered the same problems as the emergency aid 
programmes led by the UN and despite the substantial but waning funds provided by the 
international community, no coherent framework for rehabilitation has yet been developed. 
Bryden (1995) argues that “many of today’s ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ programmes 
are designed to do little more than to repair, piecemeal, the ruins of the form er system:
UN agencies and NGOs rarely consider to what extent their programmes may 
replicate the profoundly flawed and dysfunctional expansion of the old 
unsustainable, largely artificial, and aid-dependent Somali State.
Some argue that this criticism may be partly premature. In Somaliland, rebuilding previous 
water supply systems, im plem enting functioning primary health services in place, and 
beginning restoration of primary education were key priorities as perceived by ordinary 
Somalis not just outsiders. But as the 1993-1995 Baidoa experience illustrates, a degree of 
stability and a political context in which service delivery does have priority governmental 
backing and at least some civil servants to operate it, are essential to sustained rehabilitation 
owned by the communities which must ultimately rehabilitate and develop themselves.
The European Comm ission’s rehabilitation programme is probably an exception to the 
standard framework employed by the UN and most NGOs. Following the Addis Ababa 
Declaration in December 1993 which donor agencies agreed on conditions for providing aid 
to Somalia, the EC started funding rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. According to 
this declaration, the criteria for providing rehabilitation aid are “peace and security and the 
existence of responsible Somali authorities on a regional and local level” (The EC Somalia 
Unit 1997: 4). Using these criteria the EC funded several im portant rehabilitation operations 
in Somaliland and the northeast and some limited reconstruction activities in central and 
southern Somalia. However, the UNDP and most of the large UN agencies (e.g. UN
11 W hich had actually benefited from southern disorder by becoming a major transit route spawning a bubble
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Development Office for Somalia) concentrate on operations that they believe would help “the
*  1 2 * future Somali government” in its reconstruction and development. They base their
^ programmes on the assumption that there is going to be a central Somali state in the near
future -  an optimistic assumption given that fact that Somalia has been without such a state 
for nearly a decade, but has a functioning de facto  government in the Northwest (ex British 
Somaliland) paralleled by a melange of statelets and bandit zones in what was Somalia 
(Italian Somaliland).
Despite the existence of stability and relative peace since 1992, Somaliland has received 
relatively little rehabilitation because of questions over the international legitimacy of the 
government. The UN, for instance, claims that large-scale rehabilitation or development 
programmes could not be earned out because of a lack of international recognition. Gilkes, 
[1993 #388: 60] rejects this and points out that “a great deal could be done by international 
agencies, or by governments, in terms of aid, irrespective of Som aliland’s claims to 
independence. It is certainly disingenuous to refuse assistance on the grounds that this 
prejudges the issue of recognition; the refusal in itself equally prejudges the matter”. In 
Somaliland, perhaps the most important physical single external rehabilitation programme 
has been the restoration of the water system to the city of Hargeisa by Oxfam and UNICEF. 
An estimated two-thirds of the city’s population now have running water, compared to less 
than a third prior to the onset of the conflict, while the largest dominantly domestic one has 
been the city government guided beginning of the reconstruction of Hargeisa..
In fact the urban water sector more broadly and the rehabilitation of Berbera port -  including 
management, trade data collection and customs operations as well as the physical 
infrastructure demonstrate what can be done even within the constraints of uncertainty 
internationally as to the final status of the Hargeisa government i.e. national, confederal state 
or provincial.
UNICEF has catalysed and coordinated urban water restoration in five urban areas -  
intriguingly including Burao during its insurgency -  in coordination both with the Somaliland 
government and with groups of government and NGO financing and implementing bodies for 
each project. In principle -  unequally to date in practice -  these are being phased over to 
domestic authorities (relatively strong urban ones in Hargeisa and Berbera) on a sustainable 
basis. The present challenge is to build up scattered rural -  i.e. pastoralist oriented -  
initiatives into a comparable territorial programme. In principle the M inistries of Water and
economy but little evident civil governance rebuilding.
12 Like most of  the Nairobi-based UN offices set up to work with “future Somali state” , UNDOS is also known 
as the “M inistry o f  Planning in Exile" (USAID 1997).
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of Livestock are strongly in favour; in practice they need catalytic technical assistance for 
strategic planning (and its coordination among the water, livestock, finance and local 
government) and an external actor coordinator. Hopefully UNICEF’s recent desire to narrow 
its operational role in respect to broader children-friendly policies (UNICEF, 1998) will not 
be seen as preventing a “catalytic”/”advocacy” role in this direction. UNICEF has been quite 
explicit in word and deed. That it is dealing with a “government” in Somaliland while also 
being totally opaque (necessarily as a UN agency) on whether that government is national, 
confederal or provincial.
Surprisingly the Berbera coordinating agency is UNCTAD. On statistical, port managerial 
and customs issues it is the main implementer while on infrastructure it has mobilised 
governmental (including UK) and EU funding/implementation. It too works closely with a 
Port Authority, Customs and Treasury as clearly existing (recognisable in that sense) entities 
of substance and side-steps their ultimate de jure  (recognition in that sense) status.
The challenge in this case is to broaden or deepen funding sources to reconstruct the arterial 
highway to Hargeisa and Ethiopia and to rehabilitate (in this case by sustaining development 
well beyond previous peak levels) the transit trade through developing ancillary facilities to 
the port proper. Because Berbera is Ethiopia’s second port and the EU both treats Somalia as 
an ACP (Lome) member for programme funding purposes and has sub regional funds for the 
Horn, an EU led (and EU member -  e.g. UK, Italy -  complemented) regional project on the 
Berbera -  Addis corridor would appear a practicable way forward since Ethiopia de facto  
recognises and works with the Somaliland government not least on trade and transit issues.
In both cases a training component is needed Som aliland’s senior civil service is often 
surprisingly competent and experienced but rapidly greying. Some go back to the previous 
Somaliland Republic and most at least twenty years. Very few professionals were recruited 
after the early 1970s and none has been trained since the late 1980s. Water, transport, 
statistics and customs, are among the key areas for civil service renewal and modernisation so 
that a start in these sectors could be built toward a more general programme quickly adding 
livestock and education as well as decentralised governance capacity (given the key roles of 
the Berbera and Hargeisa Municipal and the Berbera Port Authorities).
The informal and medium scale enterprise sectors in Somaliland, as in the northeast region, 
has proved resilient. The economy is buoyant, businesses are thriving, and informal markets 
are functioning remarkably well. Livestock and crop production and public service provision 
has also recovered. This is less true of the northeast which never had much production 
(beyond an unsustainable prawn fishing sub-sector which has recovered but faces declines
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from over-fishing). In addition, the transit role of Berbera-Hargeisa-Borama in respect to
*
Ethiopia is long standing and econom ically viable, whereas that of Bosaso with Mogadishu is 
dependent on security constraints on the use of the Mogadishu harbour.
The existence peace and of a free-market environment has facilitated the re-establishment of 
remittance flows from Somali workers and merchants “over the water” and in East Africa and 
Italy as well as wealthy Somali expatriates living abroad and the repatriation of capital and 
people who brought new skills and ideas. In both of these regions where law and order has 
been restored, there has been a shift from war and survival-oriented economy to a functioning 
market economy. Encouraged by the absence of excessive regulations, corruption, and market 
intervention, the private sector has started providing a whole range of new services that the 
country had never seen before and which were certainly unavailable (or under the counter 
luxuries for a narrow elite) during the previous regime. According to (Mubarak 1997: 2027) 
this raises “the question of whether the absence of government is a blessing in itse lf’. In 
Somaliland “compared to the political and socioeconomic conditions of late 1980s, there is 
no doubt that the welfare of the people in the republic, in general, has improved significantly” 
(M ubarak 1997: 2038). It is worth re-emphasizing that part of this improvement in 
Somaliland at least can be attributed to the state as provider, m obiliser and coordinator.
This evolution does pose some dilemmas. The khat trade has been perceived as ineradicable. 
Therefore it has been taxed (and to that extent regulated) which has limited khat-armed band- 
crime links and provided up to a quarter of tax revenues. But it also sidesteps the social, 
productivity, external account, khat not being produced in Somalia/Somaliland but in 
Kenya/Ethiopia, and household problems resulting from overuse, of this relatively mild but 
time consuming and costly narcotic.
The economic boom in Somaliland is partly reflected in the foreign trade that goes through 
the Red Sea port of Berbera. The current merchandise exports and imports are estimated to be 
at least twice the level before the war in 1988. A substantial proportion of the imports is re­
exported to the Somali region in Ethiopia and to some Ethiopian towns such as Jigjiga, 
Harare and Dire Dawa. International trade generates revenue equivalent to 60 per cent of the 
country’s annual budget of $US 30 million (Mubarak 1997). The small port of Bosaso in the 
Northeast has experienced a similar increase in the volume of foreign trade. This port which 
was not affected by the civil war continues to be used by traders to export livestock and other 
* commodities such as incense and hides.
The resilience and success of the informal sector is not new. Even during Barre’s regime it 
“demonstrated considerable resourcefulness and resilience by weathering frequent policy
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reversals, persistent high inflation and worsening security problems in the 1980s” (World 
Bank 1990: 10). In many areas it has proved to be an engine for economic reconstruction and 
has increasingly become an incentive for peace-making and political rehabilitation. This is 
not surprising. Somali historic patterns include arrangements for safe passage (subject to fees) 
for merchants across hostile lines or even through conflict zones. It is, for example, possible 
to send goods from Nairobi to Mogadishu, and on to Kismayu, via Bardhere and Baidao using 
substantial Somali merchant transporters despite the fact that these routes cross three to six 
distinct military/political jurisdictions. This is something which aid programmes should 
understand and use as well as promoting policies that can provide the environm ent for the 
continued growth of the domestic commercial/transport sector.
6.2 Political Rehabilitation
Perhaps the most critical of all reconstruction efforts in Somalia is the question of political 
rehabilitation. Views diverge greatly on how to reconstitute the Somali State. Some argue that 
the question of state reconstitution process should take its own course, in the hope that new 
state (or states) structures will emerge from the civil society once hostilities end (Doombos 
and M arkakis 1994; Prendergast 1997). These analysts question the necessity of a common 
central state given the recent experience of the state and the asserted improved general 
welfare of the people in most parts of the country since the disintegration and collapse of the 
central state. Doombos and Markakis (1994) further argues that the lack of compelling 
reasons such as a common enemy (which no longer exists) and the believe that pooling 
resources would not necessarily produce benefits work against the need for a common central 
state in the first place. “The fact that Somalia did for some time constitute a state cannot be 
considered a sufficiently convincing reason to go back to it again, unless one finds that there 
were elements in it that are still worth retaining or building upon” (Doombos and Markakis 
1994: 87). According to Prendergast (1997) a common central state is more of a priority for 
the international aid and diplomacy that only work through governments than for the highly 
decentralised emerging local authorities in the country. But “it is not good enough to want to 
have a state because the UN wants it as counterpart, mailbox or for fear of blank spots 
emerging on the political map of Africa” (Doombos and Markakis 1994: 87).
Under the broad mandate given to UNOSOM  to help rebuild Somali state, the UN has 
attempted to reconstitute a central state but has not been successful. M ore recent political 
reconstruction conferences have not been organised under the UN auspices, but nevertheless 
its continued involvement has ensured that the same framework with the exclusive focus on 
the formation of a central government is used. So far the most promising reconciliation 
initiative was hosted by the Ethiopian government, with a mandate from IGAD, in the resort
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town of Sodere from November 1996 to January 1997. Unlike at previous conferences, 
holding of a peace and reconciliation conference (similar to the one in Borama) in Bosaso 
town was agreed. However, the whole process was restarted again when Egypt, which was 
also mandated by the Arab League to help with the reconstitution of a central state, invited 
Hussein Aideed who had refused to join the Sodere meeting and the other groups to attend 
another reconciliation conference in Cairo. The Cairo conference was held in late 1997 but it 
only succeeded in wrecking the previous agreement reached in Addis Ababa. Subsequently, 
the Ethiopian government has accused Egypt of hijacking the peace negotiations and failing 
to consult IGAD member countries. Disagreements between Ethiopia (representing IGAD) 
and the Arab League (which has recently shown an interest in the Somali affairs) are likely to 
make process more complicated.
The neighbouring countries have long been involved in the search for peaceful settlement to 
the Somali conflict and have supported reconciliation initiatives, though their role has 
somewhat been limited in the past by the UN involvement. This is because of the regional 
dimension of the conflict, which has, to varying degrees, affected all the neighbouring 
countries - Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. These countries host large numbers of 
Somali refugees, but insecurity in Somalia and the widespread availability of weapons also 
affect them .13 A radical Islamic fundamentalist groups (e.g. Al-Itahad) who have claimed 
terrorist attacks in Ethiopia have bases in southern Somalia and have significant support and 
killing capacity. During the UN operation in Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, in particular, 
complained about the lack of consultation by the UN. The Ethiopian government has also 
raised the issue of the Somali conflict in the regional bodies such as the OAU and IGAD.
On the uprooting one thorn bush at a time principle, the building up of a series of zones of 
governance (Greater Mogadishu, Middle and U pper Shibelle, Lower Shibelle, Baidoa/Bay, 
Bardhere and -  later -  Kismayu/Juba) based on elders -  merchants -  Islamic leaders coalition 
to join the existing Bosaso area authorities and the -  rather different -  Somaliland 
government might constitute a way forward. These could restore law and order plus basic 
service capacities and work on trade-transport-customs affecting all of them. The next logical 
step would be a confederation moving toward a federation of the Southern and Bosaso zones. 
Only after that is achieved would it seem practicable to face the thorny issue of Somalia -  
Somaliland federation, confederation or coordination. At present no sane Somalilander could 
wish to “rejoin” or even confederate with “Somalia” and in any event there is neither one all 
Somalia state nor even zonal governance entities comparable with the Hargeisa government 
with which to confederate.
13 During the war the number o f  Somali refugees in Ethiopia was estimated to have been around 1 million
7. Social Renewal: Islam, Gender, National Minorities
In the social sector the war has wrought havoc. It has, however, by no means destroyed 
historic organisational and mutual support mechanisms. In particular blood group and 
community (which are, especially in rural areas, overlapping) ties have survived and become 
more central in the absence of a state. However, they are less able to provide safety nets than 
in previous -  since 1969 largely drought -  crises because of the insurrection’s and the war’s 
toll on lives, herds and remittance flows. Historic safety nets -  whether survival, food or loan 
animals to rebuild herds -  can be adequate only when a substantial fraction of the group have 
not been severely impacted.
However, by weakening historic patterns and by removing the heavy hand of a regime that 
oppressed any effective organisational activity not controlled by itself, the war has created 
opportunities for social renewal building on what has survived. These are not rehabilitation 
in the sense of recreating the past but renewal along modified lines. Three aspects are of 
particular relevance: Islam, gender and national minorities.
7.1 Islam and Social Action
Somalia/Somaliland is 99% Islamic and perhaps 90% practising or semi-practising Muslims. 
Islam in Somalia -  with recent limited exceptions -  is Sunni. Islam is the basis for values and 
worldview.
Somali practice of Islam is neither ultra prescriptive (as in Saudi), theocratic (as in Iran), 
fiercely conservative (as with the Wahabi of Saudi) nor militantly exclusivist (as with Iranian 
Shia). This pattern is by no means unusual in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, while a major 
conservative and conserving force -  e.g. in Koranic schools’ role in socialisation and 
internalisation of community values -  it has not been a dynamic one -  e.g. over 90% of 
Koranic school teaching was memorisation and reproduction of the Koran in Arabic which 
neither teachers nor pupils understood. Somali Islam has rarely -  at least in this century -  
been an active intellectual force, theologically or otherwise, nor has it usually taken a lead on 
social issues, except in the sense of maintaining moral standards and strengthening mosque 
communities' resistance to corrosive forces. Under the Barre regime mosque leaders who 
sought to engage in social reflection, criticism and/or action were suppressed; especially, but 
not only, if they were from the missionary led, Iranian implanted Shia strand.
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In the post 1990 situation this has changed. More Sheiks and more teachers are educated. In 
the absence or weakness of other institutions mosques and Koranic schools have become 
more important. This renewal of Islam should not be perceived merely as a temporary 
bridging operation until the state can take over again but as an opportunity for social and civil 
society renewal.
Somali society and governance are informed by the values of Islam as practised in 
Somalia/Somaliland. However, neither is theocratic. The Somali historic civil governance 
triumvirate of elders-merchants-warlords probably predates Somali conversion to Islam and is 
certainly influenced by and parallel to the sacral not an integral part of it. Islamic leaders - 
except on occasion in protesting secular abuses and calling on the authority of the Holy Koran 
to do so (a repetitive nightmare to Barre) - are not secular political figures. Nor do secular 
leaders seek to appropriate the title "Commander of the Faithful" - the militant mobilising 
theme is against outsiders whether lineage, sub clan or foreign with an occasional Islamic 
gloss (as with the Lugh area Ogadeni/Al-Itahad today).
This is in fact the commonest pattern of African Islamic societies and their civil governance. 
However it has not been and is not universal. In 18th and 19th century Nigeria the Fulani 
Jihad was both an internal Islamic reform movement and a military outsweep justified on 
Koranic principles. The Sardauna of Sokoto both asserted and was perceived as being "The 
Commander of the Faithful". Similarly in late 19th Century Sudan The Mahdi led both an 
Islamic and Nationalist resurgence against the corrupt religious and exploitative military- 
economic presence of the Khedive of Egypt and his British allies/masters. The Mahdi was 
the undisputed sacral as well as secular leader of Sudanese nationalists.
In the Nigerian case the political heirs of the Jihad remain dominant and act to ensure Islamic 
support but are not nor perceived as authoritative sacral figures (nor as particularly devout) 
and the military high command is by no means homogeneously Northern nor Islamic. In the 
Sudan the Uma party remains to a substantial extent the vehicle of mainstream Sudanese 
Islam (al Turabi’s Ikhwan is a minority and arguably sacrally heterodox fraction) and the 
literal heir of the Mahdi - Sadiq al Mahdi - is both its political and, at least symbolically its 
sacral head (and a devout practising Muslim).
Therefore it is a significant fact - especially given its proximity to Saudi (the only truly 
theocratic state on the Arabian peninsula) and the Sudan - that Somali governance and society 
have been and remain non theocratic.
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The issue of ‘m ilitant’ or ‘fundamentalist’ Islam needs to be addressed primarily to clear 
away misconceptions. Militancy in Somali Islam is primarily against perceived evils (e.g. 
invaders and shiftas/bandits) and for nationalism and stability. ‘Fundamentalism ' (a Christian 
term applied by the northwest to Islamic groups hostile to it with little regard to the nature of 
their theology) is uncommon.
On the Ogaden border around the town of Lugh there is a group of militants. However, these 
are primarily Ogadeni Pan-Somali irredentists who have sought -  inter alia -  to carry out 
assassinations against Ethiopian Somali Region leaders as traitors to the ‘Greater Som alia’ 
concept. They are enemies of other factions in Somalia. They are Muslims but (unlike, say, 
the Fulani Jihad in Nigeria) Islam is not their motivating force.
Southwest o f Bosaso is a cluster of militants who have carried on destabilisation efforts, 
banditry and assassinations in the town. Their leaders are ex-Barre army officers who appear 
to be seeking to use Islam as an acceptable cloak to disguise their pasts.
In M ogadishu North and in Hoddur as well as, in several other districts policing and courts 
have been taken over by mosques/Islamic organisations under Sharia law. However, this is 
hardly m ilitancy but rather gap filling. In M ogadishu North it is a delegation by the Mahdi 
M ohammed government because it lacked resources for civil policing and a court system. At 
least a modicum of law and order, not theocracy, is the goal.
Possibilities of reviving the social role of Islam -  and their limitations -  can be illustrated by 
law and order, education, health and gender. Sharia law has always applied to family law and 
in practise both it and minor disputes were largely adjudicated within the mosque framework. 
Policing and settlem ent of criminal law cases were an area of struggle between blood groups 
and the government legal apparatus. Commercial law (as opposed to mediation which was 
Sharia influenced but not mosque linked) was largely secular and governmental. The present 
role of m osques/m osque related bodies is gap filling to avert anarchy, protect daily life and 
business, lim it bloodshed, suppress banditry. It is probably seen as a temporary role and 
inferior to a state derived and operated system so long as the latter is effective, honest and 
respects Sharia principles (not necessarily particular forms or practices). Certainly in 
Somaliland recreation of a civil police force and of a court system operating on the old 
(British) Som aliland code (largely imported from the UK via India) has been seen as a 
priority by the Government, the Council of Elders, and most Somalilanders and has largely 
been achieved. Hargeisa and, to a slightly lesser extent, Berbera are far safer cities than 
Nairobi and, not unrelatedly, their police and courts are much better regarded.
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Education is different. Koranic schools as of the late 1980s had over 300,000 pupils -  then 
comparable to state primary schools. Today their numbers are about the same -  whereas state 
(Somaliland only), com munity and NGO primary education may total 100,000. In 1995
30,000 Somaliland, 25,000 Mogadishu, 15,000-20,000 Bay were plausible estimates. The 
former has since risen though the latter has fallen since the Aideed conquest.
Koranic education strengths have been legitimacy, community, support, outreach to 
pastoralists (teachers travel with pastoral bands) and socialisation. Its limits have been 
untrained, often illiterate teachers and overconcentration on memorisation and literal 
reproduction (usually drawn in dust or on slates with curdled milk/soot/ink) of the Holy 
Koran in the Arabic which few teachers and nearly no pupils understood.
The limitations are not inherent. Late 1980s studies showed up to 10% of Koranic schools 
(almost all of them urban) had one or more other subjects. The common ones were reading 
the Holy Koran in the Somali translation (accepted as authentic although not authoritative in 
the same sense as the original Arabic), arithmetic, literacy in Swahili and Arabic. 
Significantly, this broadening of the curriculum was parallel to schools with teachers who 
were literate and secularly and/or theologically educated linked with mosques with formally 
educated Sheiks. Today the collapse of state schooling has increased parental desire for 
broader curricula and both the increased number of formally educated Sheiks and the supply 
of ex-state school, unemployed teachers has facilitated it.
The possibility of a complementary relationship between Koranic and secular schools is fairly 
widely perceived on both sides. However, the perception is vague, what to do is not well 
thought out and efforts to assist Koranic education sometimes slightly bizarre e.g. 90% of 
UNICEF support in Bay over 1992-95 went to wells and latrines and none to supplying copies 
of the Holy Koran in Somali although these were both unavailable to most schools and a 
potentially key input into curriculum development (e.g. in literacy).
In Somaliland the M inistry of Education had a slightly clearer strategic perception, based in 
part on discussion with Koranic school leaders. However, articulation and resources largely 
remain to be built up. Elements toward such an articulation which could be explored include:
1. focusing on Koranic education as providing a base for primary (most Koranic school 
pupils are younger);
2. to that end broadening to a core curriculum including literacy in Somali reading the 
Holy Koran in Somali, numeracy and health/environmental sanitation education;
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3. with teacher training provided by the Ministry to teachers chosen by the Koranic 
schools;
4. backed by development, and provision of appropriate materials (texts, teacher’s 
guides, blackboards, chalk, paper, pencils) by the Ministry;
5. emphasis on achieving this revival in nomadic as well as in urban Koranic schools and 
studying the former as a model for mobile state primary schools (previously non­
existent with a resultant 2% to 3% enrolment of children of nomadic households in 
primary school);
6. exploration of the use of female teachers in secular subjects (potentially acceptable 
and indeed not unheard of, even if very atypical, in 1987).
That programme would require resources. Parents are overwhelmingly poor. The rural 
Koranic schools paid in milk, eggs, cuts of meat, coarse grain and goats (for successful 
memorisation of a section of the Holy Koran) and, less frequently, camels (for memorisation 
of the entire Holy Koran) -  a resource base quite unadaptable to supporting teacher training or 
purchase of books.
Islam and health education/services have not been historically associated with mosques. The 
exception of the Somali Red Crescent Society is a special case because the Red Crescent is no 
more a theologically oriented or mosque linked body than Red Cross societies are in general 
Christian or church related. (Indeed the Red Cross is derived from inverting the colours of 
the Swiss flag not from any sacral commitment.)
Exploration of the potential for renewal (in this case breaking new ground) might be useful:
1. incorporation of health/environmental education in Koranic school curricula;
2. including mosques as a (not the only) vehicle for building up town clinics (staffed by 
community chosen/state trained paramedical personnel) in urban areas to complement 
ministry provision -  a role played by Islamic groups in some parts of East Africa to a 
limited extent;
3. in parallel -  and perhaps more important -  emphasis on recreating the rural and 
nomadic state (training, low cost drug supply, supervision)/community (personnel to 
be trained, their remuneration part of cost of drugs) partnership basic health services 
which dated to the late 1940s in Somaliland and were introduced in parts of Somalia 
from about 1985;
4. while building up a similar state/community partnership programme in rural 
veterinary care -  a field vital to enhancing rural livelihoods (and therefore human 
health and nutrition). This was envisaged by UNICEF in 1987 but aborted by the 
erosion and collapse of the state.
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Again this approach requires government training, supervisory/monitoring personnel input, 
distribution system and input subsidisation resources.
In respect to gender Somali Islam has not been a driving force for oppression of women. 
Indeed the reverse can be argued. Sharia law in Somalia/Somaliland has provided a 
framework of property and income rights and of the right of women to divorce on stated 
grounds (notably non-support for six months) as well as casting no stigma on divorced 
women. Girl pupils in Koranic schools in 1987 were somewhat over a third with the 
comparable state school proportion slightly under a third. Arguably within the Somali 
patriarchal system, Islam in Somalia has been a force for protecting women against violence 
and repression by men.
An example of a potential social renewal aspect is female circumcision/female genital 
mutilation which is a very grave problem for Somalis, especially Somali girl children. 
Historically this has -  arguably spuriously -  been justified on Islamic grounds. Since 1991 a 
number of Sheiks have begun to doubt its theological basis and its desirability and some to 
back w om en’s groups in opposing it on the grounds of incompatability with the Holy Koran. 
Building on that base (not sole reliance on secular women's groups - or on statutory 
prohibitions even if they could be secured) would appear to be the most promising way 
forward.
The interaction of Islam, community and governance has been ham pered by lack of 
understanding of potential and especially of how to proceed by secular sectoral professionals. 
They are -  when Somali at least -  Muslims. But they appear to keep their professional 
expertise and their religious beliefs in separate compartments. With international agencies 
and NGOs there are the additional problems of general lack of knowledge of Islam, especially 
Somali Islam, relatd to the fact that few are M uslims which limits their initial credibility with 
Sheiks and Koranic teachers.
7.2 Gender: Notes Toward Empowerment
Gender relations in Somalia are not uniform by sector. In some respects women are less 
excluded/more empowered than in many other SSA countries (e.g. Zimbabwe). Certainly the 
patterns are very different from -  say -  Saudi Arabia. On the other hand women have no role 
in formal political processes and a minimal subordinated one outside nursing in the public 
service. Islam in Somalia/Somaliland has -  as suggested above -  been as much an 
empowering as a restrictive force.
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Socially women have significant rights including retaining earned income, to property and 
inheritance and to divorce (for non-support or abuse). Increasingly a wife can, in practise, 
veto a second wife. Purdah is now virtually unknown and polygamy -  at least classic 
polygamy with up to four wives at the same time -  much less common than before the war. 
In fact classic polygamy was never very common -  perhaps a tenth of households in 1987. 
‘California Polygam y’ (multiple, but sequential wives, or husbands) was and is common. 
Prostitution is relatively uncommon -  though less so than before the war - heavily stigmatised 
socially and legally and said to be largely practised by national minority members and 
foreigners.
Urban earning opportunities have been in small (pavement and stall), middle (barrow) and -  
very occasionally before the war -  lower upper (small shop) trade, in nursing -  teaching -  
clerking -  domestic employment and overseas (nurses, teachers, domestics concentrated in 
Yemen, Saudi, Oman, the Emirates, Kuwait and -  for domestic workers and ‘entertainers’ -  
Italy). Perhaps 50,000 (of 250,000) pre-war overseas workers/remitters were women and 
their remittances probably in excess of $50 million dominated Somali women’s cash income.
Both numbers are approximations. In the late 1980s about 30,000 trained female nurses and 
teachers were not in Somalia. Many were known to be working ‘over the w ater’. Somali 
domestic service employees were common in Saudi, Yemen and to a lesser extent Italy. 
There were also some clerks and factory workers. There is however, a risk of double 
counting -  nurses and teachers are in part working as clerks and as senior household child 
care personnel (analogous to the Pilippina graduates who are a high proportion of Hong Kong 
foreign household workers). Remittances -  except for low education household staff -  are 
unlikely to be under $100 a month and can be substantially higher for nurses and teachers.
Rural income focussed on vegetables, fruit (other than citrus and watermelons which 
appeared to be ‘m en’s crops'), chicken and eggs, cuts of meat, sheep and goat’s milk and 
handicraft. Large stock were outside women’s roles in the division of labour (as was much 
rural -  not urban -  water collection because it is closely associated with livestock and in 
particular camels) and therefore income flows. Cam el’s milk -  arguably the largest single 
component in calories and in value -  in rural Somali diets is also almost totally a male 
income source because camels are herded by men and boys often far from the base camps 
(and permanent water points) where women and children stay.
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In education female students were slightly under one in three at primary level, one in five at 
secondary and one in ten at university levels. Female teachers have been a minority at 
primary level and very unusual at higher levels. These are relatively -  but not uniquely -  low 
proportions for SSA.
W atering and fuelling -  as elsewhere in SSA -  imposed heavy burdens on women and girls' 
time and energy and probably both on girl child enrolment, school enrolment ratios and 
ability to perform in class. However, the picture is uneven because many riverain households 
or pastoral households with women, young children and girls based at ‘home camps’ with 
permanent water sources (common in the western heartland of Somaliland) do not in fact 
have far to go for water albeit they may well have to walk long distances foraging for bushes 
and scrub for fuel.
Female health in Somalia has been an area of grave weakness. The most egregious 
oppression of women and girls is the near universal imposition of female circumcision/female 
genital mutilation for patriarchal and pseudo Islamic reasons (the Holy Koran does not 
prescribe it nor is there strong evidence that it was the norm in W est Central Saudi at the time 
of the Messenger). Opposition prior to 1987 was led by small groups of Somali women and -  
rather low key -  international agency supporters. The general climate of both secular and 
Islamic thought and the universality and ‘time immemorial’ history of the practice rendered 
them ineffective -a t least at that time -  not so much by suppression as by active social, 
religious and political deafness.
Female genital mutilation -  as practised in Somalia/Som aliland -  has severe health 
consequences at the time of pregnancy. Together with high rates of female anaemia -  at least 
during pregnancy -  it results in pre war Somalia having one of the highest maternal death 
rates in the world. Given poor medical services including midwifery (less than 10% of births 
were in health facilities and not more than another tenth with the assistance of trained 
midwives), the infant and under five mortality rates were also high (although probably below 
poorer West African country levels because of the climate and the high proportion of milk in 
Somali diets). They may (before 1988) have been lower in the Northwest for climatic reasons 
(e.g. much less malaria) and highest in rural riverain areas with malaria and vestigial access to 
health education and services.
It is agreed by all observers (including Somalis) that war has affected women and gender 
relations. More men have died increasing the (never low) proportion of female headed 
households. It has -  prior to partial restoration in Somaliland by the government and NGO’s 
with a leading catalytic role played by UNICEF and more fragmentarily by NGO’s, private
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clinics and social sector groups in Somalia, especially Mogadishu -  destroyed the health 
service and the provision of pure water. These impacts have been compounded by worsened 
economic conditions (including loss of remittances -  not so much because workers were not 
abroad as because the merchant channels for remitting were disrupted), drought and 
displacement worsened national and child health/nutrition. At the worst periods (from late 
1991 to early 1993 in Somalia but in Somaliland probably in 1989-1991 during General 
Morgan's scorched earth/extermination campaign) infant and under 5 mortality in some cases 
exceed 100% per year (i.e. in three month periods over a quarter of persons under 5 died. 
Average maternal death rates may have been 50 (per 1000) and infant and under 5 over 300
i.e. in the A fghan-M ozam bican-A ngolan war period cluster of the worst in the world. These 
have since dropped substantially with more ready availability of food and, to a lesser degree, 
pure water and health services and some reconstitution of remittance channels, but remain 
above pre-w ar levels.
The w ar’s dislocation of the economy has created both barriers and opportunities. Except in 
Somaliland, not just civil governance but its payroll/jobs have ceased to exist and private 
schools, clinics plus NGO local staff are not on a comparable scale. M anufacturing has 
virtually ceased and construction fallen significantly -  albeit those employed next to no 
women so that the impact is indirect in putting dislocated male job seekers on the streets. 
Private com m erce has boomed but how many more workers it employs is unclear. The other 
boom sector -  militias -  is not open to women. Real wages almost certainly have fallen while 
whether num bers of female job holders in the private sector have risen, fallen or -  not 
im probably -  returned to about 1987 overall levels is not clear.
Opportunities in small and middle commerce have broadened. Both in M ogadishu North and 
Somaliland, as well as Bosaso but apparently less so in Baidoa, more shops, tea stalls and 
sim ilar businesses are female owned and operated and the larger ones do appear to employ 
mostly fellow women.
Rural changes in livelihoods are less clear. The small minority of women mixed farmers and 
fisher-persons has presumably grown with the increase in female headed households. 
Scattered reports indicate not only more female involvement with small stock but also -  
almost unprecedentedly - with cattle and drought animals though not yet camels (the ultimate 
symbol of the nomadic, desert patriarch).
Beyond -  and articulating from -  that very broad, but very vague, consensus data is less than 
readily available partly because systematic attempts to aggregate and to interpret it have yet to 
be made.
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Some bits of evidence do exist:
1. In Somaliland several large enterprises (in modem services as well as commerce) are 
female owned and managed. While most are apparently inherited they are growing;
2. These -  and other private enterprises -  operate a preference for women in respect to 
while collar jobs. The reason is not feminism. Women do not chew khatt and 
therefore are productive workers all day while many men tend to be chewing and 
meditating (or from a more critical perspective lazing and hallucinating) after midday;
3. In the public service there are still gender patterns -  health and education are the only 
substantial employers of women for non-clerical jobs. At professional level this 
relates to an ageing public service because of the post 1980 recruitment gap;
4. However, there are a handful of exceptions -  in police, immigration and customs in 
Somaliland - which suggest once a renewed recruitment and training function is in 
hand female access may be broadened from the pre-war pattern both as to range of 
jobs and career prospects;
5. In several cases educated Sheiks have stated jointly with wom en’s groups that female 
circumcision/female genital mutilation not only is not prescribed by Islam but is 
proscribed because inconsistent with the Holy Koran;
6. Somaliland elders while taking a firm line that a female elder is impossible because of 
history, nomadic and military leadership skill requirements accept the idea that some 
women can/should be members of the parallel legislature to supervise government 
business and provide two way communication in areas other than high politics. (In 
practice none has been elected to date.)
The first step in seeking to develop a potential programme for renewal is to seek to collect
more cases in order to have a deeper and less gap filled perspective of present gender
relations and trends. Beyond that several topics for explanation can be identified:
1. seeking to increase enrolment and reduce dropout rates of girls at all levels of
education -  at present dominantly primary which may require attention to women and 
girls’ labour saving e.g. by increasing access to nearby pure water in both urban and 
rural areas;
2. ensuring that training courses beyond those in health, education and cooking are in
practice open to women with particular attention to those posts -  e.g. clerical and 
technical service -  now frequently held by women;
3. adopting a public service equal em ployment/promotion opportunity policy with an
initial goal of 25% women in new hirings at all entry levels in all sectors except for 
the military (which is in Somalia a profession in which women would not be socially 
acceptable);
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4. facilitating overseas work for women perhaps by a placement agency (operated by 
persons with a private sector background) analogous to that of the Philippines 
identifying and publicising opportunities but also setting minimum standards;
5. studying nomadic w om en’s work time load with a view to identifying areas in which
low cost innovations might result in substantial time savings;
6. seeking to develop labour intensive public work rehabilitation (roads, culverts, water
schemes -  wells -  basins, buildings) perhaps using commercialised food aid to cover 
wages, tools, materials, (Somaliland is in permanent grain deficit) with a Botswana 
style rule that 35% of employees must be female;
7. exploring both the potential of micro credit to women -  especially female household 
heads -  and the possible co-op and/or sub lineage group borrower ‘institutions’ that 
might facilitate low cost lending, technical assistance and collection;
8. moving toward broad access basic health care with a focus on mother and child health. 
Within this a focus on village or neighbourhood or part time paramedicals chosen by 
the group they are to serve (and, if they do, be paid by) could be in terms of teams of 
one man and one woman (likely to be socially supported and, given experience with 
nurses, unlikely to generate opposition);
9. building up a nutrition service within veterinary/agricultural as well as health services
(to relate to the supply as well as demand side) linked to village women’s committees 
along the lines of the (now national) Iringa Programme in Tanzania, (and set a 50-50 
gender target for trainee recruits);
10. including a water element -  source protection and delivery area design and 
management to avoid cross pollution among drinking , household, washing and 
animal supply uses (and providing another institutional base for women acting 
together likely to be socially acceptable);
11. redevelop Public Administration education (pre entry and in service) at tertiary and 
secondary levels (including technician level units in veterinary, nutrition, health, 
education, water, clerical, bookkeeping/accounting) with 25% or higher women's’ 
intake targets. (There are women university and secondary school graduates);
12. develop a w om en’s’ group/Islamic leaders/Health M inistry based campaign against 
female circumcision/female genital mutilation with predominantly Somali design as 
well as presentation and with technical assistance -  as and when needed -  largely 
Muslim women and also religious leaders from countries with large M uslim 
populations (perhaps especially those in which the practice is not a cultural norm.
13. foreign agencies and NGOs to reverse the negative exam ple they now set by hiring 
and training Somali women for professional and technical cadre posts in their 
Somalia/Somaliland projects.
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This agenda -  especially the points relating to the public service -  is more widely and 
immediately relevant to Somaliland than to Somalia. But once greater peace and stability 
plus basic civil governance are restored in all or parts of Somalia it will also be relevant there.
7.3 National Minorities: The ‘Swahili Problem’
Somalia/Somaliland is usually perceived -  even by Somalis -  as being homogenous with no 
significant immigrant or national minorities. This is false -  at least 10% of the population of 
Somalia (though probably under 2% in Somaliland) are non-Somali Africans, predominantly 
Swahili (East African coastal) and secondarily Oromo (from the adjacent Ethiopian highland 
region).
In 1987 the Oromo minority com prised perhaps 25,000 in Somaliland, and about 75,000 in 
Somalia. The Northern Oromo are a long resident community (apparently driven into Isaaq 
country by Ogadeni raids into Oromia well ‘before the Europeans cam e’. They are associated 
with Issak sub-clans, intermarry with Somalis, have no structures of their own broader than 
lineage groups and are integrated enough to be hard to distinguish from Somalis even for 
Somalis from outside a particular locality. This suggests their num ber remains about 25,000 
and that there are probably no major special problems or challenges in respect to this 
minority.
The Southern Oromo are much less integrated and appear to ebb and flow with political and 
stability changes in Oromia and Somalia. Post 1991 events have probably led most 1987 
Somali residents of Oromo ancestry to return home to the Oromia Region. A few more 
integrated households have doubtless remained and been augmented by Oromo Liberation 
Front quasi refugees committed to Oromo independence and chauvinism and thus opposed to 
the elected Oromia Regional Government which rejects both. Present numbers are below 
1987 and may approximate 25,000. Arguably they can currently be seen better in a refugee 
than in a national minority community perspective.
The Swahili community is much larger. 1987 estimates ranged from 400,000 to 800,000 (out 
of a probably true population in Somalia - excluding the provinces which are now, once 
again, Somaliland - of about 4,000,000). 500,000 is a reasonable estimate -  i.e. one eighth of 
Somalia residents. Their status can be inferred from the common M ogadishu term for them -  
"Bantu" with many of the same connotations as in the 'Old' South Africa. The community has 
two origins. The smaller fraction came to Somalia during the period of Swahili coastal city 
states from Kismayo through M erca and Brava prior to 1500. In 1987 most were fishermen 
(with their own villages), Merca and Brava craftsmen (with their own guilds) and unskilled
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urban workers in Mogadishu. The larger fraction are descendants of slaves from Tanzania 
and Kenya shipped to Somalia by Ormanli traders from Zanzibar. They were cotton 
plantation and household slaves. The Italian occupiers abolished slavery and -  probably more 
crucial -  made cotton plantations unprofitable.
The ex-plantation slaves, with the plantations were -  literally - abandoned. M ost became de 
factor tenant farmers. This may have been modestly satisfactory for them, but in the 1950’s 
crop growing again became viable and Somali land/water right owners enforced much more 
stringent tenancies and/or shoved them back from river banks to much less satisfactory land. 
Their main opportunity came with the rise of the plantation banana industry. Somalofruit at 
its peak apparently employed over 15,000 mostly in lower Juba. The ex domestic slaves 
continued to be domestic, market and other unskilled urban labour e.g. most M ogadishu hotel 
and restaurant cleaners, sweepers and waiters in 1987 came from this community.
Except to a lim ited extent for the fishing villages and M erca/Brava craftsmen the Swahili 
suffered from m ultiple absences of sources of leverage. They had no land or water rights. 
They had no recognised sub-clans or lineage groups and indeed in most areas no social 
organisation beyond the family. Their access to the generally limited public services was very 
low. They did not share significantly in the ‘over the w ater’ employment boom of the 1970’s 
-1 9 8 0 ’s so had little resource augmentation from remittances. They were perceived as 
speaking very poor Somali and were virtually all illiterate. They no longer had links, or even 
contact, with the larger and more vibrant Kenya-Tanzania Swahili community. They lacked 
both external protectors (indeed, even interest by external agencies) and guns.
There does not appear to have been an identifiable Swahili minority in Somaliland. In respect 
to descendants o f  slaves this is not surprising. Somaliland had no cotton plantations and 
household slaves were almost exclusively a coastal urban phenomenon. W hile there was a 
Swahili city state on the Red Sea, it was small and apparently has left no identifiable Swahili 
minority in Berbera and Bosaso.
The war and instability years have gravely impacted the Swahili community -  as is only to be 
expected given their marginalised and unarmed status. Notably no conference on Som alia’s 
future and no council of elders (by definition) has ever had a Swahili member even though 
they presum ably still number about 500,000 having had nowhere external to Somalia to flee.
The fishing village artisinal groups have probably suffered least. Their losses came from the 
general shrinkage of markets, disruption of commerce and collapse of public services and are 
therefore sim ilar to those of similarly placed Somalis.
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For the riverain and urban unskilled labour Swahilis the impact has been much worse. The 
Lower Juba banana plantations have been virtually wiped out. Their replacements in Lower 
Shibelle were smaller Hebre Gadir owned and probably employ lesser numbers on 
substantially poorer terms. The market for urban unskilled labour is glutted (except perhaps 
for militias to which Swahilis have no access) and the general last hired, first fired condition 
of minorities globally can be presumed to apply to Swahilis in Mogadishu. With no 
community safety nets and virtually no access to ‘inform al’ occupations (even in pavem ent 
and stall trading Swahilis were unusual in 1987 M ogadishu except for Merca/Brava cap 
sellers) their situation is dire. A substantial number of Swahilis have been on displaced and 
are in camps (largely separate from those of Somalis) around Mogadishu and Kismayo. It 
appears that these camps have received relatively less support -  especially on capital works 
such as water supply -  than others and are worse located in respect to access to whatever 
casual labour opportunities may exist.
This analysis is based on fragmentary, qualitative data. No agency has made it its business to 
attempt to collect or analyse baseline data on the present status of the Swahili community (as 
indeed they also did not in the 1980’s). In that respect they have suffered from an invisibility 
and neglect which, however intended or unintended, has been malign. UNICEF has made 
some attempts to provide wells for Swahili displaced person communities near Mogadishu on 
the basis of parallel conditional provision of an equal num ber to neighbourhoods of groups 
more important to local authorities. While accepted in principle this initiative has made little 
progress in an unstable context.
W hat agenda for action follows is far from clear. In the context of widespread deprivation 
and struggle for survival by a dominant majority community, focussing state or social 
attention on the needs of a minority at best viewed with condescension from a position of self 
perceived superiority and who are moreover no threat to the state or the dominant social 
groups is hard to envisage, much less promote. In this area it is likely that external catalytic 
and targeted resource inputs -  involving international agencies, N G O ’s and perhaps, the 
governments of Tanzania and Kenya - will be necessary.
Ways to address the communities' crucial needs -  those of fishing villages or craftsmen are by 
no means identical to those of unskilled workers, tenant farmers and displaced persons -  may
include:
1. including Swahili components (with training of com munity personnel) for displaced 
person camps -  possibly as a condition in the context of broad support for all 
displaced persons;
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2. parallel clinic, school, water facility provision to Swahili villages and urban quarters -  
again as a condition within broader support for universal access;
3. pushing for equal access of Swahili tenants and workers to basic service units in their 
areas (again backed by conditionality);
4. pressure for tenant fanner rights certification and protection legislation when a Somali 
government or governments capable of such an exercise exists;
5. targeted small enteiprise renewal programmes (including micro credit) for fishing 
village and artisanal communities;
6. assisting community development, organisation and cultural rehabilitation efforts of 
Swahili clusters.
7. use of Tanzanian and Kenyan personnel to implement some aspects of these 
programmes and to develop informal linkages which could increase Somaliano 
Swahili self respect and provide an early warning system of human rights violations 
and/or of pauperisation.
8. Notes, Numbers, Nonsenses: Toward Baseline Data Rehabilitation
Somalia today is distinctly data deprived and deceived. The range from the "virtual reality" 
(or unreality) estimates of UNDP's Nairobi based shadow M inistry of Planning based on no 
apparent field data beyond satellite imagery to a host of specific locality studies lacking 
coordination, time series and consistency/comparability of approach is dispiriting. Even in 
Somalia and much more so in Somaliland the raw material for better macro and sectoral 
estimates exist and so do opportunities far more, more coordinated micro studies. Without 
these, analysis and policy will be handicapped.
The harm done by the absence of data and the substitution of virtual reality rumour as 
asserted fact has been highlighted in FAO's 1997-98 response to flood related epidemics of 
Rift Valley Fever and, in parallel, of human haemorrhagic diseases in Northern Kenya. On 
the basis of virtual reality autopsies of animal and human corpses from helicopters flying over 
inaccessible areas in the Juba Valley, FAO concluded the epidemics existed in Somalia. On 
no particular evidence they (unlike WHO and UNICEF) asserted the human haemorrhagic 
fever was a new variety that had species leaped from cattle. In the face of lack of any historic 
presence of Rift Valley fever in the Haud or Somaliland, and despite the long distances and 
desert blockages between them and Kenya, they asserted the epidemic had already spread to 
Northeastern Ethiopia and Somaliland. The result was Saudi banning of Berbera sheep and 
goat exports forcing diversion to the lower price (and now glutted) Yemeni, Omanli and 
Em irates markets at an annual cost to Ethiopia/Somaliland of the order of $20 million a year 
on goats and sheep (cattle were banned by Saudi in the 1980's and camels are not restricted).
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SSA has always been known for weak - gap ridden and/or inaccurate - data and Somalia even 
before the war was an extreme case (see Green and Jamal, 1987). For contextual reasons 
unofficial exports and imports as well as remittances were both massive and massively 
underestimated. Similarly camels milk - probably the largest ’cash crop’ and source of protein 
as well as of nomadic pastoralist calories was almost totally overlooked in GDP estimates. 
However, data to make reasoned order of magnitude adjustments did exist (see Green and 
Jamal, op. cit.) as did numerous little used micro data caches.
The war both changed - for the worse - the economy and radically reduced the statistical base. 
Nevertheless even for Somalia and to a much greater degree for Somaliland the materials to 
make reasoned estimates do exist - and could be improved (see Green, 1993 and 1995). 
These could deepen comprehension of present output, household income, external trade and 
fiscal as well as nutrition and basic service baselines/trends. The im plications for informing 
rehabilitation policy are fairly evident.
No precision can be expected - as Aristotle, one of the first applied political economists 
observed more generally in his Nichomean Ethics - but reasonably valid and informative 
orders of magnitude can. Further the use of extant data and qualitative materials/judgements 
can itself both identify gaps and help mobilise support for statistical rehabilitation.
8.1 Some Key Macro, Sectoral, Micro Magnitudes
A num ber of aggregated macro magnitudes need to be estimated for Somalia (and the semi 
organised statelets within it) and for Somaliland. These include Gross Domestic and Gross 
National Product, external trade, public finance, health, education, water provision, crop 
output, herd levels and offtake, fish (and prawn) catch, remittances, morbidity and mortality. 
A good deal of micro and some sectoral data is available, albeit not coordinated consistent in 
production, nor currently pooled for analysis. To adjust for consistency and aggregate is the 
first step toward gap identification (and closing) and serious estimation of areas not directly 
empirically observable. (For some early, partial efforts see Green, 1993 and 1995). In 
general the data and the possibilities for reasoned estimates are better for Somaliland than for 
M ogadishu North, Mogadishu South, the Upper Shibelle the Lower Shibelle, and Bosaso and 
very much more so than for Bardhere, Baidoa and Kismayo much less the lower Juba, Lugh 
and Galcayo.
Livestock numbers in Somalia are well below 1987 levels particularly for camels and cattle. 
In Somaliland both casual observation and reasonably informed opinion suggest sheep and
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goat flocks have recovered to 1987 levels, but not those of cattle and - especially - camels 
which have longer gestation cycles. Presumably more detailed estimates - for the mid 1990’s 
but possibly not historically - can be secured from the Ministry of Livestock. Crop estimates 
are fragmentary. On the face of it riverain grain production is down because of damage to 
irrigation works and substitution of bananas in Lower Shibelle partly (probably not fully) 
offsetting the collapse of Lower Juba production. Livestock, milk and grain estimates would 
go for (together with food import estimates) toward estimating overall food security and 
nutrition status as well as of a significant proportion of exports. Somaliland field crop 
production may be near pre-war levels but - because of orchard devastation - horticulture is 
still significantly lower. In respect to Bosaso (where - unsustainable - prawn catch levels and 
exports of 20,000 tonnes or more, worth about $40 million, have been estimated), Mogadishu 
and the coast from Mogadishu to the Kenya border fishing estimates are needed as this had 
become a substantial and rapidly growing sector (and contributor to local and urban protein 
supply if not necessarily calories) in the 1980’s.
External trade data for Berbera and Mogadishu are available from UNCTAD (the donors’ 
chosen vehicle for port technical and - relatively small - capital assistance) and in the former 
case from Som aliland’s Customs Service and the Berbera Port Authority. Especially in 
Somalia, serious problems of estimation of how traffic to other ports remain and there appear 
to be no systematic data for Bosaso. Known export data plus importing country data (e.g. 
Italy and the Arabian Peninsula plus, perhaps, CIS states for bananas and the Peninsula, the 
CIS states and possibly more broadly for prawns) should produce orders of magnitude. Total 
imports can be estim ated as exports plus remittances minus earnings held abroad. 
Remittances are probably significantly below 1987 levels in Somalia, but may be nearly 
returned to them in Somaliland. The reason for the fall is erosion of the trade network whose 
merchants conveyed remittances in the initial form of imports. There is little reason to 
suppose external worker/merchant numbers are much below 1987 (even in Saudi) - the issue 
is how much is being sent home.
In the case of Somaliland, breaking out transit traffic (Berbera is Ethiopia’s num ber 2 port 
ahead of D jibouti or Massawa but behind Asab) poses problems. On imports, Customs 
should be able to provide estimates - it collects import duty but presumably not on direct 
transit shipments. On exports - especially of livestock - the Ministry of Livestock estimates 
may be the most useful. With no quarantine station and no export taxes, neither the Port 
Authority nor Customs has had much interest in separating Somaliland and Ethiopia livestock 
for statistical or other purposes. On the import side, the massive apparent imponderable is 
khatt - a lesser problem in Somaliland where it is a major source of import duty and therefore, 
presumably, enum erated as a by-product of tax collection.
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Fiscal data - revenue and expenditure - are basically a matter of consolidating central 
government, urban authority (especially Hargeisa and Berbera) and Port Authority data. All 
are available in Somaliland. In Somalia indirect estimation is currently needed. Somewhat 
analogous situations pertain to health, education and water. Non military plus 
political/administrative civil servants apparently exist only in Somaliland (between 6,000 and
8,000 including civilian police - more precisely determinable by detailed budget analysis).
GDP and GNP can in large part be estimated by aggregating the data discussed above. Trade 
and commerce - and perhaps transport - can probably be given an order of magnitude by 
estimating margins an imports, exports and domestic food - livestock - fish consumption. 
Manufacturing is negligible and construction small (even in Hargeisa which is slowly 
rebuilding). Private services - repairs, communications, urban water and electricity, etc. - 
pose significant problems which may require sample surveys to allow gap closing estimates.
8.2 Data and Policy: Khatt and Livestock
Baseline data are not only relevant to academics and/or to emergency relief and social sectors. 
They have much broader policy informing and testing value as can be illustrated by khatt and 
livestock health.
Khatt is Somaliland’s analogue to beer socially, economically and fiscally. Like beer it is 
usually consumed socially, has a sub euphoric effect on consciousness (temporarily protecting 
from a hard world), is not normally physically addictive but (because the world remains hard) 
psychologically difficult to drop. Except in huge (and unusual) quantities it is not usually 
directly health impairing, but does often absorb disproportionate shares of income and - 
because of the time devoted to chewing - reduces productivity. Like beer in the 19th century 
UK, khatt chewing is primarily a male habit and is w idespread in urban areas but less so 
(because it needs to be consumed within 48 hours of picking and is all imported) in rural 
areas. (Khatt has had the effect of increasing opportunities for female waged employment - 
even preferential access in some clerical, commercial and production jobs.)
Khatt is also in Somaliland - via import duties - the largest single source of state revenue. 
The government views it as socially and economically undesirable - at least at believed 
typical urban male consumption levels - but views banning as unenforceable and preventative 
tax rates as likely to lead to massive smuggling and pushing large merchants (especially those 
trading both in khatt and other commodities) outside the law. Further Said Barre’s attempts to 
eliminate khatt use (unsuccessful but substantially cost increasing and use decreasing) make
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any ban unpalatable, because it might be seen as a reversion to B arre’s draconic police state. 
Therefore, the policy (rather like that of UK Victorian and Edwardian Chancellors notably 
W illiam Gladstone) has been to seek to maximise revenue by substantial taxation (perhaps 
50% to 60% of retail price) and to make - not very effective - pronouncem ents against abuse 
and overuse.
A related issue is that the khatt trade supports air services (from Kenya and Ethiopia - the 
main growing areas). It is also (directly in Somalia, indirectly via Djibouti in Somaliland) the 
source of local currency for most external agencies (who thereby provide dealers a means of 
converting sales revenue into the dollars needed to buy the leaf in Kenya and Ethiopia). To 
describe the agencies as laundrettes for khatt revenues is correct. But in the absence of any 
banking system in Somalia and of a generally accepted one in Somaliland and the absence of 
large external shilling holders other than khatt merchants there is no very evident alternative. 
Buying the notes abroad - e.g. in Djibouti for Hargeisa - merely makes the laundering 
indirect.
Data on what proportion of urban, settled rural and nomadic Somalis consume khatt, how 
much, how often, at what cost do not exist. Approximations could be built up with some 
indications as to how serious the productivity impact and the drain on household incomes and 
territorial foreign exchange receipts are. That could be of use in devising optimal tax polices 
and evolving better targeted messages discouraging overuse - optimally in cooperation with 
mosque leaders, some of whom perceive khatt, or at the least its overuse, as anti Koranic 
although others back it on semi-theological or sacral ritual grounds.
Animal health is another area in which policy evoluation from data should be useful. In 
Som alia building up data may at present be limited to very qualitative and impressionistic 
judgem ents. In Somaliland with a functioning, professionally staffed M inistry of Livestock 
with at least some technical assistance much more can be achieved in the short run.
Among the implications are:
1. identifying priority veterinary drug needs based on existing morbidity and mortality 
patterns;
2. establishing the parameters for a re-established quarantine facility at Berbera with 
professional (preferably partly Saudi or Saudi nominated) staff to facilitate access to 
the key Saudi market (which pays substantially more than Yemen, Oman and the 
Emirates);
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3. exploring the possibilities of a para-veterinary service by men chosen by pastoral 
com munities, trained by the M inistry and supplied (at cost or with a subsidy) with 
basic veterinary drugs;
4. checking previous reports that half of animal drought deaths come after the rains 
return because of cooler weather, more humid air and radically higher water content in 
grazing leading to respiratory and diarrhoeal diseases. These were - for pre war 
Somalia - argued to be controllable (with one half to two thirds fall in deaths) by five 
drugs (including salt for oral rehydration) whose use was known to pastoralists but 
which neither the veterinary service nor traders provided. If confirmed, the 
im plications - especially in conjunction with the previous point - are evident.
This agenda might cost $2.0 to $3.5 million a year plus perhaps $5 million to recreate the 
quarantine facility. Saving of animal lives might be worth $5.0 million a year and free access 
to the Saudi market for sheep, goats and cattle $10 million. With reasoned arguments based 
on data it is probable the EU, Saudi, FAO, UNCTAD (the present channel for Port of Berbera 
related projects and perhaps the USA, UK and Italy would meet start-up costs while 
quarantine fees and drug charges could claw back perhaps $2.5-$3.0 million a year. $15 
million a year for a country of 1.5 million with a GDP per capita of perhaps $200 is not 
negligible.
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